शक्तिबाद (Śaktivādaḥ)

In this book, Gadādhara Bhattāchārya presents a theory of the meaning of words. This work is divided into three chapters: 1. Sāmānyakāṇḍa, 2. Viśesakāṣḍa and 3. Pariśiṣtakāṇḍa. In Sāmānyakaṇḍa, the author undertakes a detailed analysis of vṛtti of words. Here one comes across a definition of śakti in terms of which a word denotes its meaning. The theory of anvitābhidhāna has been refuted. In the Viśeṣakaṇḍa, the author undertakes an analysis of the meaning of words denoting an individual and the meaning of the words denoting a universal. Prabhākara theory of meaning has been refuted. This chapter contains an analysis of indexicals and demonstratives. The third chapter viz. Pariśiṣtakaṇḍa contains a defence of the view that the śakti of a word lies in the individual that is qualified by the corresponding universal. Views of several Mīmāṃsaka philosophers have been critically assessed.

प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)

In this book, Harirama Tarkavagisa critically assesses the Mīmāṃśa theory of self-luminosity of knowledge. According to Prabhākara, the knower, the object of knowledge and the knowledge itself are apprehended in one go. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that knowledge is inferred through a property called knownness. Murāri Miśra, another Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, holds that knowledge is known in a subsequent knowledge called introspection. Harirāma, following the footsteps of Gaṅgeśa, argues that since sometimes doubt regarding the validity of knowledge arises in the third moment after the origin of knowledge, the validity of the knowledge is apprehended by something other than the totality of the causal conditions of that knowledge. Harirama further argues that there is something wrong with the thesis that knowledge is self-luminious.

अनुमितेमानसत्त्वबिचाररहस्यम् (Anumiter Mānasatvavicārarahasyam)

Harirama Tarkavagisa, in this book, examines the proposal that inference could be subsumed under supersensual perception as accepted in Nyāya. Harirama argues that not all cases of inference could be so explained. He imagines all sorts of possible objections to the view that inference, really speaking, is a kind of perception and refutes all these, defending the thesis that inference is to be regarded as an independent source of knowledge.

सिद्धान्तलक्षणम् (Siddhānta Lakṣaṇam)

The final definition of vyāpti, known as siddhāntalakṣaṇa, has been explained by Jagadīśa in this work. The final definition of vyāpti is: where pratiyogyasāmānadhikaraṇya tāsāmānādhikaraṇatyantābhāvāpratiyogitāvacchedakabhacchinam does not hold, their vyāpti stays in the same locus. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi comments on this definition of vyāpti. Jagadīṣa further explains this final definition of vyāpti.

নবদ্বীপ মহিমা (Nabadwip Mahima)

This book is perhaps the first attempt to portray the detailed history of Navadvipa. The author starts the discourse with the history of the name ‘Navadvipa’ along with a description of the relation of Navadvipa to the rest of Bengal during the ancient period. The second part of the book contains a detailed description of the scholars of Navadvipa who worked on Navya-Nyāya, Smṛti, and Tantra. In the third chapter, one finds an elaborate presentation of Sri Chaitanya’s biography along with a discussion on Vaishnava religion. Since Navadvipa was ruled by the king of Krishnagar for a long time, there is a discussion on the rulers of Krishnagar, their contribution to the Navadvipa scholarship as patrons. The author also adds a discussion on the famous musicians, eminent persons trained in English education and business persons of Navadvipa.

प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)

The original  text of Gaṅgeśa, called Tattvacintāmaṇi, has been commented on by  both Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Gadāhara Bhattācārya. If knowledge is gained through the ways of knowing, then the very nature of knowledge rests on the nature and veridicality of these recognised ways of knowing. An examination of the veridicality of the ways of knowing is known as pārāmānya. In this book, both Raghunātha and Jagadīśa offer a detailed analysis of the debate concerning the nature and veridicality of the very idea of pramāṇa.