शक्तिबाद (Śaktivādaḥ)

In this book, Gadādhara Bhattāchārya presents a theory of the meaning of words. This work is divided into three chapters: 1. Sāmānyakāṇḍa, 2. Viśesakāṣḍa and 3. Pariśiṣtakāṇḍa. In Sāmānyakaṇḍa, the author undertakes a detailed analysis of vṛtti of words. Here one comes across a definition of śakti in terms of which a word denotes its meaning. The theory of anvitābhidhāna has been refuted. In the Viśeṣakaṇḍa, the author undertakes an analysis of the meaning of words denoting an individual and the meaning of the words denoting a universal. Prabhākara theory of meaning has been refuted. This chapter contains an analysis of indexicals and demonstratives. The third chapter viz. Pariśiṣtakaṇḍa contains a defence of the view that the śakti of a word lies in the individual that is qualified by the corresponding universal. Views of several Mīmāṃsaka philosophers have been critically assessed.

সংস্কৃত কলেজ পত্রিকা (Sanskrit College Patrika)

This is an annual journal published by Sanskrit College, Calcutta. The essays published in this journal are written by teachers and students of the college. There are articles on Sanskrit philosophy and Sanskrit literature.

शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Part-1))

In this book Jagadīa Tarkālaṃkāra presents a detailed analysis of various aspects of śabdapramāṇa from the perspective of Navya-Nyāya. The book starts with a critical assessment of the views of Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsaka philosophers with regard to the veridicality of śabda as a pramāṇa. This is followed by a discourse on the nature of meaningful words, the nature of prākṛti, pratya, nipāta. A definition of a sentence is formulated. The relation between word and meaning in its different aspects has been presented. The book ends with a discussion on the nature and different kinds of samāsa.

প্রস্থানভেদঃ (Prasthānaveda)

The present work is a commentary by Madhusudana Saraswati on a part of Śivamahimāstotra (Hymns to the glory of Śiva) written by Puṣpadanta. In this commentary, Madhusudana talks about eighteen disciplines of knowledge. All the āstika and nāstika systems of knowledge could be included in the eighteen disciplines and all these systems of knowledge, either directly or indirectly, aimed at determining the nature of god. According to Madhusudana, even the philosophy of art written by Bharata aims at worshiping god. Madhusudana argues that one could talk about three fundamental prasthānas viz. ārambhavāda, parināmavāda and vivartavāda. We start our intellectual journey from ārambhavāda and then through pariṇāmavāda reach vivartavāda. It is only in vivartavāda that one realizes that the world is a vivarta of Brahmaṇ. The varieties of prasthānas have been created only to cater to the needs of people of various inclinations.

प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)

The original  text of Gaṅgeśa, called Tattvacintāmaṇi, has been commented on by  both Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Gadāhara Bhattācārya. If knowledge is gained through the ways of knowing, then the very nature of knowledge rests on the nature and veridicality of these recognised ways of knowing. An examination of the veridicality of the ways of knowing is known as pārāmānya. In this book, both Raghunātha and Jagadīśa offer a detailed analysis of the debate concerning the nature and veridicality of the very idea of pramāṇa.

प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)

In this book, Harirama Tarkavagisa critically assesses the Mīmāṃśa theory of self-luminosity of knowledge. According to Prabhākara, the knower, the object of knowledge and the knowledge itself are apprehended in one go. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that knowledge is inferred through a property called knownness. Murāri Miśra, another Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, holds that knowledge is known in a subsequent knowledge called introspection. Harirāma, following the footsteps of Gaṅgeśa, argues that since sometimes doubt regarding the validity of knowledge arises in the third moment after the origin of knowledge, the validity of the knowledge is apprehended by something other than the totality of the causal conditions of that knowledge. Harirama further argues that there is something wrong with the thesis that knowledge is self-luminious.