प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)

In this book, Harirama Tarkavagisa critically assesses the Mīmāṃśa theory of self-luminosity of knowledge. According to Prabhākara, the knower, the object of knowledge and the knowledge itself are apprehended in one go. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that knowledge is inferred through a property called knownness. Murāri Miśra, another Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, holds that knowledge is known in a subsequent knowledge called introspection. Harirāma, following the footsteps of Gaṅgeśa, argues that since sometimes doubt regarding the validity of knowledge arises in the third moment after the origin of knowledge, the validity of the knowledge is apprehended by something other than the totality of the causal conditions of that knowledge. Harirama further argues that there is something wrong with the thesis that knowledge is self-luminious.

सिद्धान्तलक्षणम् (Siddhānta Lakṣaṇam)

The final definition of vyāpti, known as siddhāntalakṣaṇa, has been explained by Jagadīśa in this work. The final definition of vyāpti is: where pratiyogyasāmānadhikaraṇya tāsāmānādhikaraṇatyantābhāvāpratiyogitāvacchedakabhacchinam does not hold, their vyāpti stays in the same locus. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi comments on this definition of vyāpti. Jagadīṣa further explains this final definition of vyāpti.

जागदीशीव्याधिकरणम् (Jāgadīśvyādhikaraṇam)

This is a prakaraṇa text on the Nyāya theory of vyāpti written by Jagadīśa. The main theme of the work centres around the nature of vyāpti.Knowledge of vyāpti is the cause of inferential knowledge. If the definition of vyāpti is constructed in terms of avyābhicāritatva, then one could explain  avyābhicāritatva in five alternative ways. And none of these alternatives is acceptable, for this understanding of vyāpti would fail to account for kevalānvayi inference. In order to remove this problem, the definition of vyāpti is reconstructed as pratiyogivṛttidharmāvacchinna-pratiyogitākabhāvarupa vyādhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnabhāva. Jagadīśa examines this new definition of vyāpti and offers his justification, refuting all the possible objections.

বাঙালির সারস্বত অবদান: বঙ্গে নব্যন্যায়চর্চা (Bangalir Saraswat Avadan: Bange Navyanyaya Charcha)

This is perhaps the most authentic history of Navya-Nyāya scholarship in Bengal with special emphasis on Navadvipa. In this book, the author presents a detailed description of the biographies and the works of the philosophers of Navadvipa. The author divides his work in the following chapters: 1. The Pre-Śiromaṇī age, 2.Raghunātha Śiromaṇī, 3. Bengali Commentators on Śiromaṇī, 4. The Post-Gadādhara Era, 5. Bengali Naiyāyikas in Kāśidhāma, 6. Nyaya Schools of Bengal. The author, with sufficient historical evidence, determines the time of many of the Navya-Nyāya scholars and he also proposes his views on the authorship of many of the Navya-Nyāya commentaries.

নবদ্বীপ মহিমা (Nabadwip Mahima)

This book is perhaps the first attempt to portray the detailed history of Navadvipa. The author starts the discourse with the history of the name ‘Navadvipa’ along with a description of the relation of Navadvipa to the rest of Bengal during the ancient period. The second part of the book contains a detailed description of the scholars of Navadvipa who worked on Navya-Nyāya, Smṛti, and Tantra. In the third chapter, one finds an elaborate presentation of Sri Chaitanya’s biography along with a discussion on Vaishnava religion. Since Navadvipa was ruled by the king of Krishnagar for a long time, there is a discussion on the rulers of Krishnagar, their contribution to the Navadvipa scholarship as patrons. The author also adds a discussion on the famous musicians, eminent persons trained in English education and business persons of Navadvipa.

The Padārthatattva-Nirūpaṇam (পদার্থতত্বনিরুপনম)

The present book, written by Raghunātha Śiramaṇi and translated and explained in Bengali by Madhusudan Bhattacharya,  is an attempt to present his views on the metaphysical categories generally accepted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. Raghunātha, of course, refutes some of the categories accepted by earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. He even does not hesitate to accept some of the views of the Mīmāṁsā philosophy, thereby going against his own tradition.