शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Part-1))

In this book Jagadīa Tarkālaṃkāra presents a detailed analysis of various aspects of śabdapramāṇa from the perspective of Navya-Nyāya. The book starts with a critical assessment of the views of Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsaka philosophers with regard to the veridicality of śabda as a pramāṇa. This is followed by a discourse on the nature of meaningful words, the nature of prākṛti, pratya, nipāta. A definition of a sentence is formulated. The relation between word and meaning in its different aspects has been presented. The book ends with a discussion on the nature and different kinds of samāsa.

বাঙালির সারস্বত অবদান: বঙ্গে নব্যন্যায়চর্চা (Bangalir Saraswat Avadan: Bange Navyanyaya Charcha)

This is perhaps the most authentic history of Navya-Nyāya scholarship in Bengal with special emphasis on Navadvipa. In this book, the author presents a detailed description of the biographies and the works of the philosophers of Navadvipa. The author divides his work in the following chapters: 1. The Pre-Śiromaṇī age, 2.Raghunātha Śiromaṇī, 3. Bengali Commentators on Śiromaṇī, 4. The Post-Gadādhara Era, 5. Bengali Naiyāyikas in Kāśidhāma, 6. Nyaya Schools of Bengal. The author, with sufficient historical evidence, determines the time of many of the Navya-Nyāya scholars and he also proposes his views on the authorship of many of the Navya-Nyāya commentaries.

प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)

The original  text of Gaṅgeśa, called Tattvacintāmaṇi, has been commented on by  both Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Gadāhara Bhattācārya. If knowledge is gained through the ways of knowing, then the very nature of knowledge rests on the nature and veridicality of these recognised ways of knowing. An examination of the veridicality of the ways of knowing is known as pārāmānya. In this book, both Raghunātha and Jagadīśa offer a detailed analysis of the debate concerning the nature and veridicality of the very idea of pramāṇa.

अनुमितेमानसत्त्वबिचाररहस्यम् (Anumiter Mānasatvavicārarahasyam)

Harirama Tarkavagisa, in this book, examines the proposal that inference could be subsumed under supersensual perception as accepted in Nyāya. Harirama argues that not all cases of inference could be so explained. He imagines all sorts of possible objections to the view that inference, really speaking, is a kind of perception and refutes all these, defending the thesis that inference is to be regarded as an independent source of knowledge.

Gadādhara’s Theory of Objectivity Viṣayatāvāda (Part-Two)

In this book, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya offers a detailed analysis of the text called Viṣayatāvāda, written by Gadādhara. After explaining the traditional Navya-Nyāya theory of objectivity, the author presents the later Navya-Nyāya theory of objecthood where it has been argued that objecthood cannot be cognition itself. Gadādhara’s theory of relation has been analyzed in terms of objecthood of qualified cognition. A detailed analysis of the ideas of qualificandness, qualificandumness, predicatehood could be found in this book.

प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)

In this book, Harirama Tarkavagisa critically assesses the Mīmāṃśa theory of self-luminosity of knowledge. According to Prabhākara, the knower, the object of knowledge and the knowledge itself are apprehended in one go. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that knowledge is inferred through a property called knownness. Murāri Miśra, another Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, holds that knowledge is known in a subsequent knowledge called introspection. Harirāma, following the footsteps of Gaṅgeśa, argues that since sometimes doubt regarding the validity of knowledge arises in the third moment after the origin of knowledge, the validity of the knowledge is apprehended by something other than the totality of the causal conditions of that knowledge. Harirama further argues that there is something wrong with the thesis that knowledge is self-luminious.