अनुमितेमानसत्त्वबिचाररहस्यम् (Anumiter Mānasatvavicārarahasyam)

Harirama Tarkavagisa, in this book, examines the proposal that inference could be subsumed under supersensual perception as accepted in Nyāya. Harirama argues that not all cases of inference could be so explained. He imagines all sorts of possible objections to the view that inference, really speaking, is a kind of perception and refutes all these, defending the thesis that inference is to be regarded as an independent source of knowledge.

Gadādhara’s Theory of Objectivity Viṣayatāvāda (Part-One)

In this volume, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya presents an analysis of the fundamental concepts in Navya-Nyāya. The themes that have been discussed in this book are 1. Navya-Nyāya theory of Relation, Being in Aristotle and Navya-Nyāya, Navya-Nyāya theory of universals, Navya-Nyāya theory of abstraction, Navya-Nyāya theory of definition, Navya-Nyāya theory of causation, Comparative analysis of Frege and Gadādhara.

ध्ब्मसजन्यभावयो: कार्यकारणभावरहस्यम् (Dhvaṃsa- Janyabhāvayoḥ Kārya-Kāraṇabhāvarahasyam)

In this essay, Harirama Tarkavagisa undertakes an analysis of the nature of the causal relationship between a positive effect and destruction. The author examines the nature of the inference viz. Dhvaṃsa is due to vināśa. If one takes into consideration this inference, there must be a hetu here and the hetu could be said to have an upadhi viz. Bhāvatva. Harirama, in this context, presents different ways of formulating the causal relation. The author ends this essay by concluding that the positive effect (janyabhāva) could be said to be the cause of destruction (dhvaṃsa) through the relation of pratiyogitva.

Gadādhara’s Theory of Objectivity Viṣayatāvāda (Part-Two)

In this book, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya offers a detailed analysis of the text called Viṣayatāvāda, written by Gadādhara. After explaining the traditional Navya-Nyāya theory of objectivity, the author presents the later Navya-Nyāya theory of objecthood where it has been argued that objecthood cannot be cognition itself. Gadādhara’s theory of relation has been analyzed in terms of objecthood of qualified cognition. A detailed analysis of the ideas of qualificandness, qualificandumness, predicatehood could be found in this book.

নবদ্বীপের ইতিহাস ও সংস্কৃতি (Navadviper Itihas O Samskriti)

This work is a historical study of Navadvipa. The present work consists of eleven chapters. The first chapter serves as an introduction to the history of Navadvipa. The second chapter devotes itself to the geographical location of Navadvipa. The third chapter takes note of the Buddhist influence. In the fourth chapter, there is a survey of historical studies done on Navadvipa. The cultural movements in Navadvipa constitute the fifth chapter. The history of old temples and monasteries in Navadvipa is the focus of the sixth chapter. The rule of Krishnachandra is the point of discussion in the seventh chapter. The eighth chapter describes the education scenario in Navadvipa. The debate concerning the birthplace of Chaitanya Deva forms the major part of the discussion in the ninth chapter. In the tenth chapter, one finds a description of crematoriums and graveyards in Navadvipa. The last chapter refers to some historical studies on Navadvipa already done. This book contains some ancient maps and pictures of the old temples of Navadvipa.

शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-2))

In the second volume of Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, Jagadīśa presents a detailed analysis of Prabhākara’s kāryānvitaśaktivāda and refutes this view. Jagadīśa defends the niravacchinna śaktivāda of the words like ākāśa etc. The view of Raghuntha Siromani with regard to the causal nexus of linguistic understanding has been refuted. Jagadisa offers an analysis of the nature of paribhāṣika śabda and argues that proper names given to individuals do not have śakti and they are to be treated as paribhāśaika śabda. Jagadīśa defends the view that śakti resides in all the three loci: the individual, the universal and the relation of samavāya that holds between an individual and the universal. Jagadīśa also refutes the Mīmāṃsaka view that the sentence has lakṣaṇā and the view of Ālaṃkārika regarding the vyāñjanā relation has been rejected. In this book, Jagadīśa offers a detailed analysis of different kinds of lakṣaṇā and in this context, one comes across a criticism of the Prabhākara thesis that the word having lakṣaṇā is not the cause of syntactic knowledge of the sentence. This book ends with an analysis of the nature of yogaruḍa śabda.