নবদ্বীপ মহিমা (Nabadwip Mahima)

This book is perhaps the first attempt to portray the detailed history of Navadvipa. The author starts the discourse with the history of the name ‘Navadvipa’ along with a description of the relation of Navadvipa to the rest of Bengal during the ancient period. The second part of the book contains a detailed description of the scholars of Navadvipa who worked on Navya-Nyāya, Smṛti, and Tantra. In the third chapter, one finds an elaborate presentation of Sri Chaitanya’s biography along with a discussion on Vaishnava religion. Since Navadvipa was ruled by the king of Krishnagar for a long time, there is a discussion on the rulers of Krishnagar, their contribution to the Navadvipa scholarship as patrons. The author also adds a discussion on the famous musicians, eminent persons trained in English education and business persons of Navadvipa.

शक्तिबाद (Śaktivādaḥ)

In this book, Gadādhara Bhattāchārya presents a theory of the meaning of words. This work is divided into three chapters: 1. Sāmānyakāṇḍa, 2. Viśesakāṣḍa and 3. Pariśiṣtakāṇḍa. In Sāmānyakaṇḍa, the author undertakes a detailed analysis of vṛtti of words. Here one comes across a definition of śakti in terms of which a word denotes its meaning. The theory of anvitābhidhāna has been refuted. In the Viśeṣakaṇḍa, the author undertakes an analysis of the meaning of words denoting an individual and the meaning of the words denoting a universal. Prabhākara theory of meaning has been refuted. This chapter contains an analysis of indexicals and demonstratives. The third chapter viz. Pariśiṣtakaṇḍa contains a defence of the view that the śakti of a word lies in the individual that is qualified by the corresponding universal. Views of several Mīmāṃsaka philosophers have been critically assessed.

तर्कामृत (Tarkāmṛta)

In this book, Jagadīśa Tarkalaṃkāra expounds on all the major issues that one finds in Navya-Nyāya. It is a compendium of Navya-Nyāya philosophy.

शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-3))

The third volume of Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā contains an analysis of samāsa. The book starts with a presentation and analysis of the definition of samāsa in general. Jagadīśa distinguishes nitya samāsa from anitya samāsa. The present work contains an analysis of six kinds of samāsa, viz, 1. Dvigu, 2. Tatpuruṣa, 3. Avyaībhāva, 4. Bahubrīhi, 5. Dvandva. The author accepts another samāsa viz. Upapada. The Grammarians hold that the vigraha vākya and the samasta vākya do not have the same śakti and so the nature of understanding the meaning of the vigraha vākya does not amount to understanding the meaning of the samāsa. Jagadīśa refutes this view of the Grammarian and argues that both the vigraha vākya and the samāsa do possess the same meaning. While the traditional Pāṇinian grammar includes karmadhārāya samāsa in tatpuruṣa samāsa and dvigu samāsa in karmadhāraya samāsa, the Katantra Grammar includes dvigu samāsa in tatpuruṣa samāsa. Jagadīśa intervenes in this debate and holds that karmadhāraya and dvigu are independent samāsas and so he thinks that there are six kinds of samāsas viz. tatpuruṣa, avyaībhāva, bahubrīhi, dvandva, karmadhārāya and dvigu. In this book one finds a detailed analysis of all these six kinds of samāsa. Even if Jagadīśa does not accept upapada samāsa as an independent samāsa, still he offers an analysis of upapada samāsa on behalf of those who accept upapada samāsa.

অধ্যাপক মধুসূদন ন্যায়াচার্য্য জন্মশতবর্ষ স্মারকগ্রন্থ (Adhyapak Madhusudan Nyayacharya Janmasatabasra Smarakgrantha)

This is a collection of essays in memory of Madhusudan Nyāyācārya, edited by Bimalkrishna Bhattacharya and Sajal Chaudhuri. All the essays center around the themes from Navya-Nyāya, topics that Madhusudan Nyāyācārya has worked on.

अनुमितेमानसत्त्वबिचाररहस्यम् (Anumiter Mānasatvavicārarahasyam)

Harirama Tarkavagisa, in this book, examines the proposal that inference could be subsumed under supersensual perception as accepted in Nyāya. Harirama argues that not all cases of inference could be so explained. He imagines all sorts of possible objections to the view that inference, really speaking, is a kind of perception and refutes all these, defending the thesis that inference is to be regarded as an independent source of knowledge.