शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdśaktiprakāśikā)

Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā contains six chapters: 1. Nāmaprakaraṇa, 2. Samāsaprakaraṇa, 3. Supvibhaktiprakaraṇa, 4. Kārakaprakaraṇa, 5. Akhyātaprakaraṇa, 6. Taddhitaprakaraṇa.  The present volume contains two commentaries on Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā viz. . Kriśnakānti commentary by Krisnakānta Vidyāvāgīśa and Pravbodhinī commentary by Rāmabhadra Siddhāntavāgīśa.

নদিয়ার ইতিহাস- চর্চা (Nadiyar Itihas Carca)

This book is a collection of essays on varieties of aspects of life in Nadia, presently a district in West Bengal, India. Since once upon a time Navadvipa was the main centre of Nadia, and later Krisnanagar became the capital from where the ruler ruled his kingdom including Navadvipa, much of the history of Navadvipa is closely associated with the history of  Nadia. This book is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, the essays focus on the different archaeological sites found in Nadia and bring to light their historical importance. The second chapter focuses on the rivers, waterways and road transport of Nadia. In the third chapter, the essays highlight the importance of the local festivals and the contribution of logical artisans with special reference to weavers. The essays in the fourth chapter take note of the contribution of the musicians and theatre personalities of Nadia. The book ends with a chapter containing articles on different religious and political movements that took place in Nadia.

प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)

In this book, Harirama Tarkavagisa critically assesses the Mīmāṃśa theory of self-luminosity of knowledge. According to Prabhākara, the knower, the object of knowledge and the knowledge itself are apprehended in one go. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that knowledge is inferred through a property called knownness. Murāri Miśra, another Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, holds that knowledge is known in a subsequent knowledge called introspection. Harirāma, following the footsteps of Gaṅgeśa, argues that since sometimes doubt regarding the validity of knowledge arises in the third moment after the origin of knowledge, the validity of the knowledge is apprehended by something other than the totality of the causal conditions of that knowledge. Harirama further argues that there is something wrong with the thesis that knowledge is self-luminious.

शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-3))

The third volume of Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā contains an analysis of samāsa. The book starts with a presentation and analysis of the definition of samāsa in general. Jagadīśa distinguishes nitya samāsa from anitya samāsa. The present work contains an analysis of six kinds of samāsa, viz, 1. Dvigu, 2. Tatpuruṣa, 3. Avyaībhāva, 4. Bahubrīhi, 5. Dvandva. The author accepts another samāsa viz. Upapada. The Grammarians hold that the vigraha vākya and the samasta vākya do not have the same śakti and so the nature of understanding the meaning of the vigraha vākya does not amount to understanding the meaning of the samāsa. Jagadīśa refutes this view of the Grammarian and argues that both the vigraha vākya and the samāsa do possess the same meaning. While the traditional Pāṇinian grammar includes karmadhārāya samāsa in tatpuruṣa samāsa and dvigu samāsa in karmadhāraya samāsa, the Katantra Grammar includes dvigu samāsa in tatpuruṣa samāsa. Jagadīśa intervenes in this debate and holds that karmadhāraya and dvigu are independent samāsas and so he thinks that there are six kinds of samāsas viz. tatpuruṣa, avyaībhāva, bahubrīhi, dvandva, karmadhārāya and dvigu. In this book one finds a detailed analysis of all these six kinds of samāsa. Even if Jagadīśa does not accept upapada samāsa as an independent samāsa, still he offers an analysis of upapada samāsa on behalf of those who accept upapada samāsa.

अनुमितेमानसत्त्वबिचाररहस्यम् (Anumiter Mānasatvavicārarahasyam)

Harirama Tarkavagisa, in this book, examines the proposal that inference could be subsumed under supersensual perception as accepted in Nyāya. Harirama argues that not all cases of inference could be so explained. He imagines all sorts of possible objections to the view that inference, really speaking, is a kind of perception and refutes all these, defending the thesis that inference is to be regarded as an independent source of knowledge.

सिद्धान्तलक्षणम् (Siddhānta Lakṣaṇam)

The final definition of vyāpti, known as siddhāntalakṣaṇa, has been explained by Jagadīśa in this work. The final definition of vyāpti is: where pratiyogyasāmānadhikaraṇya tāsāmānādhikaraṇatyantābhāvāpratiyogitāvacchedakabhacchinam does not hold, their vyāpti stays in the same locus. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi comments on this definition of vyāpti. Jagadīṣa further explains this final definition of vyāpti.