Gaṅgeśa
Gaṅgeśa’s Theory of Indeterminate Perception (Nirvikalpakavāda) Part- 2
The present book is an English translation and explanation of the chapter on Nirvikalpakavāda in Tattacintāmaṇi by Gaṅgeṣa. Each of the parts of the original text has been followed by an explanation. Many objections to Gaṅgeṣa’s theory of indeterminate perception have been explained and responded to by the author.
History of Navya Nyāya in Mithilā
The present book is a detailed history of Navya-Nyāya scholarship in Mithilā, located in the state of Bihar, India. Of the two main centres of Navya-Nyāya, Mithilā is well-known for being the birthplace of Gaṅgeśa, the originator of Navya-Nyāya. The book has six chapters: 1. Udayanācarya: his predecessors and successors, 2. Pre-Gaṅgeśa writers, 3. Gaṅgeśa Upādhyaya and his son Vardhamāna, 4. The age of expansion, 5. The age of four M’s and 6. Modern scholarship. The author presents brief life-sketches and brief descriptions of the works of these philosophers.
Tattvacintāmaṇi তত্ত্বচিন্তামনি
In the present book, Brahmacari Medhacaitanya, the author, presents the views of Gaṅgeśa as one finds in the chapter on perception in his Tattvacintāmaṇi. There are eleven chapters in the book: 1. Maṅgalavāda, 2. Prāmānyavāda, 3. Pramālakṣaṇa-purvapakṣa, 4. Pramālakṣaṇa-siddhānta, 5. Anyathākhyātivāda, 6. Sannikarsavāda. 7. Samavāyavāda, 8. Anupoalabdhi-apramānyavāda, 9. Abhāvavāda, 10, Pratyakṣakaraṇavāda and 11. Mano-anutvavāda.
प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)
The original text of Gaṅgeśa, called Tattvacintāmaṇi, has been commented on by both Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Gadāhara Bhattācārya. If knowledge is gained through the ways of knowing, then the very nature of knowledge rests on the nature and veridicality of these recognised ways of knowing. An examination of the veridicality of the ways of knowing is known as pārāmānya. In this book, both Raghunātha and Jagadīśa offer a detailed analysis of the debate concerning the nature and veridicality of the very idea of pramāṇa.
प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)
In this book, Harirama Tarkavagisa critically assesses the Mīmāṃśa theory of self-luminosity of knowledge. According to Prabhākara, the knower, the object of knowledge and the knowledge itself are apprehended in one go. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that knowledge is inferred through a property called knownness. Murāri Miśra, another Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, holds that knowledge is known in a subsequent knowledge called introspection. Harirāma, following the footsteps of Gaṅgeśa, argues that since sometimes doubt regarding the validity of knowledge arises in the third moment after the origin of knowledge, the validity of the knowledge is apprehended by something other than the totality of the causal conditions of that knowledge. Harirama further argues that there is something wrong with the thesis that knowledge is self-luminious.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-1))
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā is an important text written by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra containing an analysis of śabda pramāna following the Navya-Nyāya tradition. This work is a defence of many of the theses of Gaṅgeśa, the author of Tattvacintāmaṇi. In many places, the views of Bhatṛhari and Srīpatidatta, the author of Kalapa-pariśiṣta, have been critically assessed and defended. The author offers a detailed analysis of how the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is generated through the presence of the elements like ākāṁṣkā, yogyatā and āsatti. Since the meaning of a word is defined in terms of śakti, a question arises with regard to the locus of śakti. Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas hold that śakti stays in the universal. Jagadīśa refutes this thesis of the Mīmāṁsakas. The author also refutes the thesis that the locus of śakti is the individual object, a view that is propagated by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. Jagadīśa defends the view that combines both the insights that the locus of śakti is the individual object and the locus of śakti is the universal. In this book, Jagadīśa presents an analysis of the nature of lakṣanā. In this work we also find an analysis of how ākaṁkṣā, yogyatā and āsatti could be treated as the cause of understanding the meaning of a sentence. Jagadīśa, however, refutes the view that the knowledge of tātparya is the cause of understanding the meaning of a sentence, instead proposes the view that prakaraṇajñāna is the cause of understanding the meaning of a sentence. Thus in the present work the author, after defending śabdapramāṇa as an independent pramāṇa, offers his analysis of the ways of generating linguistic understanding.