inference
Bauddhācāryasammata Svārthānumāner Saṁkṣipta Ālocanā বৌদ্ধাচার্যসম্মত স্বার্থানুমানের সংক্ষিপ্ত আলোচনা
This book, written by Heramba Chattopadhyay, is a detail presentation of the Buddhist theory of svārthānumāna. In the introduction, the author presents a historical survey of the key contributions of Buddhist philosophers in the field of logic. In the main body of the text, the reader finds an analysis of the Buddhist theory of inference along with a presentation of the different criticisms levelled against the Buddhist theory by rival philosophical systems of classical Indian Philosophy.
Inference in Indian and Western Logic
The present book is an analysis of the theory of inference. In the seven chapters, the book deals with 1. Introducing the theme, 2. Judgement and Truth, 3. Inference and Validity, 4. Implication, 5. Constituents of Inference, 6. Types of Inference and 7. Concluding observation. In many contexts, the author brings in the insights of several western philosophers and compares these with those of Indian philosophers.
Nyāya Darśne Parāmarśa ন্যায় দর্শনে পরামর্শ
This book, written by Aruna Chakrabarti, offers an analysis of the role of parāmarśa in the generation of inferential knowledge. The book is divided into five chapters: 1. The nature and definition of parāmarśa, 2. Kinds of parāmarśa, 3. Parāmarśa as the cause or vyāpāra , 4. Parāmarśa as the cause of anumiti and 5. The relation between pakṣata and parāmarśa. Since Inference is a recognized source of knowledge for Nyāya, an analysis of parāmarśa as the cause of inferential knowledge forms an integral part of any discussion on Nyāya epistemology.
The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge
The present book is a detailed exposition of Nyāya epistemology. The book contains twenty chapters: 1. Introduction, 2. The nature and forms of knowledge, 3. Valid knowledge and its method, 4. The factors of valid knowledge, 5. The test of truth and error, 6. The definition of perception, 7. The psychology of perception, 8. Ordinary perception and its objects, 9. Three modes of ordinary perception, 10. Extraordinary perception, 11. The nature of inference, 12. The grounds of inference, 13. Classification and Logical forms of inference, 14. The fallacies of inference, 15. The nature and forms of upamāna, 16. Upamāna as an independent source of knowledge, 17. The nature and classification of śabda, 18. Of words, 19, Of sentences, 20. Other sources of knowledge. This book thus offers an analysis of the different pramāṇas accepted by Nyāya.
अनुमितेमानसत्त्वबिचाररहस्यम् (Anumiter Mānasatvavicārarahasyam)
Harirama Tarkavagisa, in this book, examines the proposal that inference could be subsumed under supersensual perception as accepted in Nyāya. Harirama argues that not all cases of inference could be so explained. He imagines all sorts of possible objections to the view that inference, really speaking, is a kind of perception and refutes all these, defending the thesis that inference is to be regarded as an independent source of knowledge.
ध्ब्मसजन्यभावयो: कार्यकारणभावरहस्यम् (Dhvaṃsa- Janyabhāvayoḥ Kārya-Kāraṇabhāvarahasyam)
In this essay, Harirama Tarkavagisa undertakes an analysis of the nature of the causal relationship between a positive effect and destruction. The author examines the nature of the inference viz. Dhvaṃsa is due to vināśa. If one takes into consideration this inference, there must be a hetu here and the hetu could be said to have an upadhi viz. Bhāvatva. Harirama, in this context, presents different ways of formulating the causal relation. The author ends this essay by concluding that the positive effect (janyabhāva) could be said to be the cause of destruction (dhvaṃsa) through the relation of pratiyogitva.
पक्षताप्रकरणम् (Pakṣtā Prakaraṇam)
In this book Jagadśa undertakes a study of the concept of pakṣatā. Pakṣatā is regarded as the cause of inference. Some define pakṣatā as sādhyasaṃśaya. Some others define pakṣatā as siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣtasiddhyabhāvaḥ. A detailed analysis of all these issues has been done by the author in this book.