Mīmāṃśa
Introduction To The Purva Mīmāṃsā
The book, while offering an introduction to Purva-Mīmāṃsā, is divided into three chapters, each chapter divided into several sections. The first chapter contains a general discussion on the nature of darśana, on the general significance of Purva-Mīmāṃsā and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā including both the schools of Kumarila and Prabhākara. Chapter two contains a discussion on pramā and pramāṇa in Mīmāṃsā philosophy. In chapter three, one finds discourse on the nature of Ātman, God and liberation. The last part of the book contains a discussion on the relationship between Mīmāṃsā maxims and Hindu Law.
Īśvarasiddhivivecanam (Part-II) ईश्वर – सिद्धि – विवेचनम्
This book written by Dīnanāth Tripathi contains a discussion on the Mīmāṃṣā argument that tries to prove that one does not need to prove god since the consequences like attainment of svarga etc. are the results of the performance of Vedic sacrifices. In this context, the author explains the Nyāya view that justifies the existence of god in terms of parataḥ prāmānyavāda. The author also presents the Nyāya arguments against the Sāṃkhya view and concludes that if the views of Kapila etc are accepted, then the prāmānya of the Vedas would be threatened.
Mānmeyodayaḥ (Volume-1) মানমেয়োদয়: (২য় খন্ড)
This book written by Dīnanāth Tripathi is a detail exposition of Mīmāṃsā text Mānameodaya, originally authored by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa. This book is divided into two sections, viz. Pramāṇa and Prameya. After proposing the definition of pramāṇa, the author presents a detailed analysis of all the six pramāṇas accepted by the Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā philosophy. During this discourse, the views of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, Buddhism and Prābhākara have been refuted. In the Prameya section, there is a discussion on the five prameyas accepted in the Bhaṭṭa school, viz. dravya, jāti, guṇa, kriya and abhāva.
प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)
In this book, Harirama Tarkavagisa critically assesses the Mīmāṃśa theory of self-luminosity of knowledge. According to Prabhākara, the knower, the object of knowledge and the knowledge itself are apprehended in one go. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that knowledge is inferred through a property called knownness. Murāri Miśra, another Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, holds that knowledge is known in a subsequent knowledge called introspection. Harirāma, following the footsteps of Gaṅgeśa, argues that since sometimes doubt regarding the validity of knowledge arises in the third moment after the origin of knowledge, the validity of the knowledge is apprehended by something other than the totality of the causal conditions of that knowledge. Harirama further argues that there is something wrong with the thesis that knowledge is self-luminious.