Showing all 15 results

A Study in the Dialectical of Sphoṭa

Gaurinatha Sastri, in this book, deals with the idea of sphoṭa as one finds in the Grammarian Tradition in classical Indian philosophy. The book contains four chapters: 1. Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā objections to the idea of sphoṭa, 2. The views of Kumārila, Śabara and Jayanta on sphoṭa. 3. Classification of Sphoṭa and 4. Authority of Āgama on sphoṭa.

Advaitasiddhiḥ (Volume-2) অদ্বৈতসিদ্ধি: (২য় খন্ড)

In this book, Yogendranāth Tarkasāṃkhyavedantatīrtha, the author, offers a detailed analysis of the first definition of ignorance that one finds in the text Advaitasiddhi by Madhusūdana Sarasvati. The book starts with presenting a history of Advaita-Vedānta followed by the biography of Madhusudana Saraswati. There is also an introductory analysis of some of the key Nyāya ideas, for the author of Advaitasiddhi himself takes recourse to some Nyāya techniques in defending the Advaita thesis.

Īśvarasiddhivivecanam (Part-I) ईश्वर – सिद्धि – विवेचनम्

This book, written by Dinanath Tripathi, contains a discussion on the Nyāya argument for the existence of God. Here one finds a detailed discussion on the first vipratipatti sentence alluded to Nyāyakusumāñjali where the views of  the Cārvākas and other philosophers have been presented and refuted.

Īśvarasiddhivivecanam (Part-II) ईश्वर – सिद्धि – विवेचनम्

This book written by Dīnanāth Tripathi contains a discussion on the Mīmāṃṣā argument that tries  to prove that one does not need to prove god since the consequences like attainment of svarga etc. are the results of the performance of Vedic sacrifices. In this context, the author explains the Nyāya view that justifies the existence of god in terms of parataḥ prāmānyavāda. The author also presents the Nyāya arguments against the Sāṃkhya view and concludes that if the views of Kapila etc are accepted, then the prāmānya of the Vedas would be threatened.

Mānmeyodayaḥ (Volume-1) মানমেয়োদয়: (২য় খন্ড)

This book written by Dīnanāth Tripathi is a detail exposition of Mīmāṃsā text Mānameodaya, originally authored by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa. This book is divided into two sections, viz. Pramāṇa and Prameya. After proposing the definition of pramāṇa, the author presents a detailed analysis of all the six pramāṇas accepted by the Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā philosophy. During this discourse, the views of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, Buddhism and Prābhākara have been refuted. In the Prameya section, there is a discussion on the five prameyas accepted in the Bhaṭṭa school, viz. dravya, jāti, guṇa, kriya and abhāva.

Nyāya Darśne Parāmarśa ন্যায় দর্শনে পরামর্শ

This book, written by Aruna Chakrabarti, offers an analysis of the role of parāmarśa in the generation of inferential knowledge. The book is divided into five chapters: 1. The nature and definition of parāmarśa, 2. Kinds of parāmarśa, 3. Parāmarśa as the cause or vyāpāra , 4. Parāmarśa as the cause of anumiti and 5. The relation between pakṣata and parāmarśa. Since Inference is a recognized source of knowledge for Nyāya, an analysis of parāmarśa as the cause of inferential knowledge forms an integral part of any discussion on Nyāya epistemology.

Nyāyadarśan Mate Ātmā ন্যায় দর্শন মতে আত্মা

In this book, written by Tarapada Bhattacharya, one finds an elaborate analysis of the Nyāya theory of self. Following a discussion of the proofs for the existence of self, one finds  deliberations on the nature of self as distinct from body. Nyāya arguments for the view that self is eternal and has attributes have been presented. The plurality and ubiquitous nature of self have been proved. The question about the emancipation of self has been discussed. The book ends with a discussion on the nature of god as paramātmān.

Nyāyakusumāñjali (Part-1)

The present book, edited by Narendrachandra Vedantatirtha, contains the original text (first Stavka) of Nyāyakusumāñjali along with the commentaries of Śaṅkara Miśra and Guṇānda Vidyāvāgīśa. These commentaries explain the original text sometimes by elucidating the original points and sometimes refuting the alternative conclusions. The entire first chapter of this book centres around the possible objections to the nature of causality that Nyāya argument for the existence of god depends on.

Nyāyamañjuri (Volume-1) (ন্যায়মঞ্জুরী ( ১ম খন্ড))

Nyāyamañjari (Vol 1) is a detailed Bengali translation and explanation of the original Sanskrit text Nyāyamañjari written by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. The translation and Explanation are done by Pañcānana Tarkavāgīśa. The present volume starts with a discussion on the necessity of the study of Nyāya and ends with a presentation of the Nyāya theory of abhāva.

Studies in Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika Thesim

Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theism is a study of the Nyāya arguments for God’s existence, authored by Gopikamohan Bhattacharyya. The present study focuses on the arguments advanced by Udayana.

The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge

The present book is a detailed exposition of Nyāya epistemology. The book contains twenty chapters: 1. Introduction, 2. The nature and forms of knowledge, 3. Valid knowledge and its method, 4. The factors of valid knowledge, 5. The test of truth and error, 6. The definition of perception, 7. The psychology of perception, 8. Ordinary perception and its objects, 9. Three modes of ordinary perception, 10. Extraordinary perception, 11. The nature of inference, 12. The grounds of inference, 13. Classification and Logical forms of inference, 14. The fallacies of inference, 15. The nature and forms of upamāna, 16. Upamāna as an independent source of knowledge,  17. The nature and classification of śabda, 18. Of words, 19, Of sentences, 20. Other sources of knowledge. This book thus offers an analysis of the different pramāṇas accepted by Nyāya.

The Vidhi Viveka (Volume-1) বিধিবিবেক (১ম ভাগ)

Since Mīmāṃsā philosophy is known as the study of Vedic sentences, and since knowledge of vidhi sentences are required to perform the Vedic rituals resulting in the production of dharma, analysis and classification of vidhi sentence forms an important part of Mīmāṃsā philosophy. The present book, authored by Srimohan Bhattacharya, offers an explanation of the views of Maṇḍan Miśra as one finds in  his Vidhi-Viveka with regard to the nature and varieties of vidhi sentence. The author also alludes to the Nyāya-Kanikā commentary written by Vācaspati Miśra on Vidhi-Viveka. In the course of the discussion, the author presents Maṇḍana Miśra’s refutation of the doctrine of momentariness and his rejection of the idea of omniscience targeting Buddhism, Yoga and Nyāya.

अनुमितेमानसत्त्वबिचाररहस्यम् (Anumiter Mānasatvavicārarahasyam)

Harirama Tarkavagisa, in this book, examines the proposal that inference could be subsumed under supersensual perception as accepted in Nyāya. Harirama argues that not all cases of inference could be so explained. He imagines all sorts of possible objections to the view that inference, really speaking, is a kind of perception and refutes all these, defending the thesis that inference is to be regarded as an independent source of knowledge.

जागदीशीव्याधिकरणम् (Jāgadīśvyādhikaraṇam)

This is a prakaraṇa text on the Nyāya theory of vyāpti written by Jagadīśa. The main theme of the work centres around the nature of vyāpti.Knowledge of vyāpti is the cause of inferential knowledge. If the definition of vyāpti is constructed in terms of avyābhicāritatva, then one could explain  avyābhicāritatva in five alternative ways. And none of these alternatives is acceptable, for this understanding of vyāpti would fail to account for kevalānvayi inference. In order to remove this problem, the definition of vyāpti is reconstructed as pratiyogivṛttidharmāvacchinna-pratiyogitākabhāvarupa vyādhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnabhāva. Jagadīśa examines this new definition of vyāpti and offers his justification, refuting all the possible objections.

मुक्तिबादबिचारः (Muktivādavicaraḥ)

This book is an essay on Nyāya theory of liberation. Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa, in this book, critically assesses the generally accepted definition of liberation as permanent (ātyantika) cessation (nivṛtti) of suffering (duhkha). The debate revolves around explaining the terms like ‘atyanta’ and ‘nivṛtti’. Harirama argues that the widely accepted understanding of these words fails to cover all the different kinds of liberation that philosophers talk about. Harirama proposes to describe liberation as the destruction of final suffering and the idea of finality could be understood as a universal inhering in suffering. Harirama argues that if knowledge of reality is to be regarded as the cause of liberation, then liberation is to be regarded as the permanent post-negation of sin and not of misery.