Prabhākara
Introduction To The Purva Mīmāṃsā
The book, while offering an introduction to Purva-Mīmāṃsā, is divided into three chapters, each chapter divided into several sections. The first chapter contains a general discussion on the nature of darśana, on the general significance of Purva-Mīmāṃsā and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā including both the schools of Kumarila and Prabhākara. Chapter two contains a discussion on pramā and pramāṇa in Mīmāṃsā philosophy. In chapter three, one finds discourse on the nature of Ātman, God and liberation. The last part of the book contains a discussion on the relationship between Mīmāṃsā maxims and Hindu Law.
Mānmeyodayaḥ (Volume-1) মানমেয়োদয়: (২য় খন্ড)
This book written by Dīnanāth Tripathi is a detail exposition of Mīmāṃsā text Mānameodaya, originally authored by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa. This book is divided into two sections, viz. Pramāṇa and Prameya. After proposing the definition of pramāṇa, the author presents a detailed analysis of all the six pramāṇas accepted by the Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā philosophy. During this discourse, the views of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, Buddhism and Prābhākara have been refuted. In the Prameya section, there is a discussion on the five prameyas accepted in the Bhaṭṭa school, viz. dravya, jāti, guṇa, kriya and abhāva.
प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)
In this book, Harirama Tarkavagisa critically assesses the Mīmāṃśa theory of self-luminosity of knowledge. According to Prabhākara, the knower, the object of knowledge and the knowledge itself are apprehended in one go. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that knowledge is inferred through a property called knownness. Murāri Miśra, another Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, holds that knowledge is known in a subsequent knowledge called introspection. Harirāma, following the footsteps of Gaṅgeśa, argues that since sometimes doubt regarding the validity of knowledge arises in the third moment after the origin of knowledge, the validity of the knowledge is apprehended by something other than the totality of the causal conditions of that knowledge. Harirama further argues that there is something wrong with the thesis that knowledge is self-luminious.
शक्तिबाद (Śaktivādaḥ)
In this book, Gadādhara Bhattāchārya presents a theory of the meaning of words. This work is divided into three chapters: 1. Sāmānyakāṇḍa, 2. Viśesakāṣḍa and 3. Pariśiṣtakāṇḍa. In Sāmānyakaṇḍa, the author undertakes a detailed analysis of vṛtti of words. Here one comes across a definition of śakti in terms of which a word denotes its meaning. The theory of anvitābhidhāna has been refuted. In the Viśeṣakaṇḍa, the author undertakes an analysis of the meaning of words denoting an individual and the meaning of the words denoting a universal. Prabhākara theory of meaning has been refuted. This chapter contains an analysis of indexicals and demonstratives. The third chapter viz. Pariśiṣtakaṇḍa contains a defence of the view that the śakti of a word lies in the individual that is qualified by the corresponding universal. Views of several Mīmāṃsaka philosophers have been critically assessed.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-2))
In the second volume of Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, Jagadīśa presents a detailed analysis of Prabhākara’s kāryānvitaśaktivāda and refutes this view. Jagadīśa defends the niravacchinna śaktivāda of the words like ākāśa etc. The view of Raghuntha Siromani with regard to the causal nexus of linguistic understanding has been refuted. Jagadisa offers an analysis of the nature of paribhāṣika śabda and argues that proper names given to individuals do not have śakti and they are to be treated as paribhāśaika śabda. Jagadīśa defends the view that śakti resides in all the three loci: the individual, the universal and the relation of samavāya that holds between an individual and the universal. Jagadīśa also refutes the Mīmāṃsaka view that the sentence has lakṣaṇā and the view of Ālaṃkārika regarding the vyāñjanā relation has been rejected. In this book, Jagadīśa offers a detailed analysis of different kinds of lakṣaṇā and in this context, one comes across a criticism of the Prabhākara thesis that the word having lakṣaṇā is not the cause of syntactic knowledge of the sentence. This book ends with an analysis of the nature of yogaruḍa śabda.