Navya Nyāya Scholarship in Navadvip Archive Collection/ Harirām Tarkavāgīśa/ Anumiter Mānasatvavicārarahasyam/ Tārānāth Nyāya-Tarkatīrtha (Commentator)/ Gourinath Sastri (Editor)/ Sanskrit College / Number of pages: 66/ Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series No. X/
अनुमितेमानसत्त्वबिचाररहस्यम् (Anumiter Mānasatvavicārarahasyam)
Harirama Tarkavagisa, in this book, examines the proposal that inference could be subsumed under supersensual perception as accepted in Nyāya. Harirama argues that not all cases of inference could be so explained. He imagines all sorts of possible objections to the view that inference, really speaking, is a kind of perception and refutes all these, defending the thesis that inference is to be regarded as an independent source of knowledge.
| System |
Nyāya |
|---|---|
| Publication Category |
Navya-Nyāya Scholarship in Nabadwip |
| Publication Author | |
| Added Author |
Nyāya-Tarkatīrtha Gourinath $e Editor. Tārānāth Sastri $e Comm. |
| Publication Language |
Sanskrit |
| Publisher Name |
Sanskrit College |
| Publication Place |
Calcutta |
| Publication Year |
1959 |
| No. of Pages |
66 |
| Series Name |
Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series No. X |
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