Navya Nyāya Scholarship in Nabadwip Archive Collection/ Jagadāśa Tarkālaṃkāra/ Śabdaśaktiprāśikā / Krishnakānta Vidyāvāgiśa and Rāmabhadra Siddhāntavāgiśa (Commentators)/ University of Calcutta/ Publication: 2007/ Number of pages: 486/ The Kashi Sanskrit Series 109
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdśaktiprakāśikā)
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā contains six chapters: 1. Nāmaprakaraṇa, 2. Samāsaprakaraṇa, 3. Supvibhaktiprakaraṇa, 4. Kārakaprakaraṇa, 5. Akhyātaprakaraṇa, 6. Taddhitaprakaraṇa. The present volume contains two commentaries on Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā viz. . Kriśnakānti commentary by Krisnakānta Vidyāvāgīśa and Pravbodhinī commentary by Rāmabhadra Siddhāntavāgīśa.
| System |
Nyāya |
|---|---|
| Publication Category |
Navya-Nyāya Scholarship in Nabadwip |
| Publication Author | |
| Added Author |
Krishnakānta $e Comm.; Siddhāntavāgiśa Rāmabhadra Comm.; Śāstrī, Pandit Dhundhirāj $e Editor., Vidyāvāgiśa |
| Publication Language |
Sanskrit |
| Publisher Name |
Chaukhambha Prakashan |
| Publication Place |
Varanasi |
| Publication Year |
2007 |
| No. of Pages |
486 |
| Series Name |
The Kasi Sanskrit Series 109 |
Kindly Register and Login to Darshan Manisha Digital Library. Only Registered Users Can Access the Content of Darshan Manisha Digital Library.
0
People watching this product now!
Description
Related products
ध्ब्मसजन्यभावयो: कार्यकारणभावरहस्यम् (Dhvaṃsa- Janyabhāvayoḥ Kārya-Kāraṇabhāvarahasyam)
In this essay, Harirama Tarkavagisa undertakes an analysis of the nature of the causal relationship between a positive effect and destruction. The author examines the nature of the inference viz. Dhvaṃsa is due to vināśa. If one takes into consideration this inference, there must be a hetu here and the hetu could be said to have an upadhi viz. Bhāvatva. Harirama, in this context, presents different ways of formulating the causal relation. The author ends this essay by concluding that the positive effect (janyabhāva) could be said to be the cause of destruction (dhvaṃsa) through the relation of pratiyogitva.
নবদ্বীপ মহিমা (Nabadwip Mahima)
This book is perhaps the first attempt to portray the detailed history of Navadvipa. The author starts the discourse with the history of the name ‘Navadvipa’ along with a description of the relation of Navadvipa to the rest of Bengal during the ancient period. The second part of the book contains a detailed description of the scholars of Navadvipa who worked on Navya-Nyāya, Smṛti, and Tantra. In the third chapter, one finds an elaborate presentation of Sri Chaitanya’s biography along with a discussion on Vaishnava religion. Since Navadvipa was ruled by the king of Krishnagar for a long time, there is a discussion on the rulers of Krishnagar, their contribution to the Navadvipa scholarship as patrons. The author also adds a discussion on the famous musicians, eminent persons trained in English education and business persons of Navadvipa.
Gadādhara’s Theory of Objectivity Viṣayatāvāda (Part-One)
In this volume, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya presents an analysis of the fundamental concepts in Navya-Nyāya. The themes that have been discussed in this book are 1. Navya-Nyāya theory of Relation, Being in Aristotle and Navya-Nyāya, Navya-Nyāya theory of universals, Navya-Nyāya theory of abstraction, Navya-Nyāya theory of definition, Navya-Nyāya theory of causation, Comparative analysis of Frege and Gadādhara.
বাঙালির সারস্বত অবদান: বঙ্গে নব্যন্যায়চর্চা (Bangalir Saraswat Avadan: Bange Navyanyaya Charcha)
This is perhaps the most authentic history of Navya-Nyāya scholarship in Bengal with special emphasis on Navadvipa. In this book, the author presents a detailed description of the biographies and the works of the philosophers of Navadvipa. The author divides his work in the following chapters: 1. The Pre-Śiromaṇī age, 2.Raghunātha Śiromaṇī, 3. Bengali Commentators on Śiromaṇī, 4. The Post-Gadādhara Era, 5. Bengali Naiyāyikas in Kāśidhāma, 6. Nyaya Schools of Bengal. The author, with sufficient historical evidence, determines the time of many of the Navya-Nyāya scholars and he also proposes his views on the authorship of many of the Navya-Nyāya commentaries.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-3))
The third volume of Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā contains an analysis of samāsa. The book starts with a presentation and analysis of the definition of samāsa in general. Jagadīśa distinguishes nitya samāsa from anitya samāsa. The present work contains an analysis of six kinds of samāsa, viz, 1. Dvigu, 2. Tatpuruṣa, 3. Avyaībhāva, 4. Bahubrīhi, 5. Dvandva. The author accepts another samāsa viz. Upapada. The Grammarians hold that the vigraha vākya and the samasta vākya do not have the same śakti and so the nature of understanding the meaning of the vigraha vākya does not amount to understanding the meaning of the samāsa. Jagadīśa refutes this view of the Grammarian and argues that both the vigraha vākya and the samāsa do possess the same meaning. While the traditional Pāṇinian grammar includes karmadhārāya samāsa in tatpuruṣa samāsa and dvigu samāsa in karmadhāraya samāsa, the Katantra Grammar includes dvigu samāsa in tatpuruṣa samāsa. Jagadīśa intervenes in this debate and holds that karmadhāraya and dvigu are independent samāsas and so he thinks that there are six kinds of samāsas viz. tatpuruṣa, avyaībhāva, bahubrīhi, dvandva, karmadhārāya and dvigu. In this book one finds a detailed analysis of all these six kinds of samāsa. Even if Jagadīśa does not accept upapada samāsa as an independent samāsa, still he offers an analysis of upapada samāsa on behalf of those who accept upapada samāsa.
सिद्धान्तलक्षणम् (Siddhānta Lakṣaṇam)
The final definition of vyāpti, known as siddhāntalakṣaṇa, has been explained by Jagadīśa in this work. The final definition of vyāpti is: where pratiyogyasāmānadhikaraṇya tāsāmānādhikaraṇatyantābhāvāpratiyogitāvacchedakabhacchinam does not hold, their vyāpti stays in the same locus. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi comments on this definition of vyāpti. Jagadīṣa further explains this final definition of vyāpti.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Part-1))
In this book Jagadīa Tarkālaṃkāra presents a detailed analysis of various aspects of śabdapramāṇa from the perspective of Navya-Nyāya. The book starts with a critical assessment of the views of Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsaka philosophers with regard to the veridicality of śabda as a pramāṇa. This is followed by a discourse on the nature of meaningful words, the nature of prākṛti, pratya, nipāta. A definition of a sentence is formulated. The relation between word and meaning in its different aspects has been presented. The book ends with a discussion on the nature and different kinds of samāsa.
पक्षताप्रकरणम् (Pakṣtā Prakaraṇam)
In this book Jagadśa undertakes a study of the concept of pakṣatā. Pakṣatā is regarded as the cause of inference. Some define pakṣatā as sādhyasaṃśaya. Some others define pakṣatā as siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣtasiddhyabhāvaḥ. A detailed analysis of all these issues has been done by the author in this book.
जागदीशीव्याधिकरणम् (Jāgadīśvyādhikaraṇam)
This is a prakaraṇa text on the Nyāya theory of vyāpti written by Jagadīśa. The main theme of the work centres around the nature of vyāpti.Knowledge of vyāpti is the cause of inferential knowledge. If the definition of vyāpti is constructed in terms of avyābhicāritatva, then one could explain avyābhicāritatva in five alternative ways. And none of these alternatives is acceptable, for this understanding of vyāpti would fail to account for kevalānvayi inference. In order to remove this problem, the definition of vyāpti is reconstructed as pratiyogivṛttidharmāvacchinna-pratiyogitākabhāvarupa vyādhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnabhāva. Jagadīśa examines this new definition of vyāpti and offers his justification, refuting all the possible objections.
प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)
In this book, Harirama Tarkavagisa critically assesses the Mīmāṃśa theory of self-luminosity of knowledge. According to Prabhākara, the knower, the object of knowledge and the knowledge itself are apprehended in one go. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that knowledge is inferred through a property called knownness. Murāri Miśra, another Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, holds that knowledge is known in a subsequent knowledge called introspection. Harirāma, following the footsteps of Gaṅgeśa, argues that since sometimes doubt regarding the validity of knowledge arises in the third moment after the origin of knowledge, the validity of the knowledge is apprehended by something other than the totality of the causal conditions of that knowledge. Harirama further argues that there is something wrong with the thesis that knowledge is self-luminious.