Navya Nyāya Scholarship in Nabadwip Archive Collection/ Jagadāśa Tarkālaṃkāra/ Śabdaśaktiprāśikā / Krishnakānta Vidyāvāgiśa and Rāmabhadra Siddhāntavāgiśa (Commentators)/ University of Calcutta/ Publication: 2007/ Number of pages: 486/ The Kashi Sanskrit Series 109
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdśaktiprakāśikā)
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā contains six chapters: 1. Nāmaprakaraṇa, 2. Samāsaprakaraṇa, 3. Supvibhaktiprakaraṇa, 4. Kārakaprakaraṇa, 5. Akhyātaprakaraṇa, 6. Taddhitaprakaraṇa. The present volume contains two commentaries on Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā viz. . Kriśnakānti commentary by Krisnakānta Vidyāvāgīśa and Pravbodhinī commentary by Rāmabhadra Siddhāntavāgīśa.
| System |
Nyāya |
|---|---|
| Publication Category |
Navya-Nyāya Scholarship in Nabadwip |
| Publication Author | |
| Added Author |
Krishnakānta $e Comm.; Siddhāntavāgiśa Rāmabhadra Comm.; Śāstrī, Pandit Dhundhirāj $e Editor., Vidyāvāgiśa |
| Publication Language |
Sanskrit |
| Publisher Name |
Chaukhambha Prakashan |
| Publication Place |
Varanasi |
| Publication Year |
2007 |
| No. of Pages |
486 |
| Series Name |
The Kasi Sanskrit Series 109 |
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सिद्धान्तलक्षणम् (Siddhānta Lakṣaṇam)
The final definition of vyāpti, known as siddhāntalakṣaṇa, has been explained by Jagadīśa in this work. The final definition of vyāpti is: where pratiyogyasāmānadhikaraṇya tāsāmānādhikaraṇatyantābhāvāpratiyogitāvacchedakabhacchinam does not hold, their vyāpti stays in the same locus. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi comments on this definition of vyāpti. Jagadīṣa further explains this final definition of vyāpti.
নবদ্বীপের ইতিহাস ও সংস্কৃতি (Navadviper Itihas O Samskriti)
This work is a historical study of Navadvipa. The present work consists of eleven chapters. The first chapter serves as an introduction to the history of Navadvipa. The second chapter devotes itself to the geographical location of Navadvipa. The third chapter takes note of the Buddhist influence. In the fourth chapter, there is a survey of historical studies done on Navadvipa. The cultural movements in Navadvipa constitute the fifth chapter. The history of old temples and monasteries in Navadvipa is the focus of the sixth chapter. The rule of Krishnachandra is the point of discussion in the seventh chapter. The eighth chapter describes the education scenario in Navadvipa. The debate concerning the birthplace of Chaitanya Deva forms the major part of the discussion in the ninth chapter. In the tenth chapter, one finds a description of crematoriums and graveyards in Navadvipa. The last chapter refers to some historical studies on Navadvipa already done. This book contains some ancient maps and pictures of the old temples of Navadvipa.
নদিয়া চর্চা (Nadiya Charcha)
The present work is a collection of essays on the history of Nadia. The book is divided into four chapters. The first chapter contains essays on the historical and archaeological importance of Nadia. The second chapter consists of articles focussing on the local religious, political and cultural events in Nadia. The third chapter consists of essays focussing on the sports events and cultural events in Nadia. The last chapter has essays referring to the debate concerning the birthplace of Chaitanyadeva.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-2))
In the second volume of Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, Jagadīśa presents a detailed analysis of Prabhākara’s kāryānvitaśaktivāda and refutes this view. Jagadīśa defends the niravacchinna śaktivāda of the words like ākāśa etc. The view of Raghuntha Siromani with regard to the causal nexus of linguistic understanding has been refuted. Jagadisa offers an analysis of the nature of paribhāṣika śabda and argues that proper names given to individuals do not have śakti and they are to be treated as paribhāśaika śabda. Jagadīśa defends the view that śakti resides in all the three loci: the individual, the universal and the relation of samavāya that holds between an individual and the universal. Jagadīśa also refutes the Mīmāṃsaka view that the sentence has lakṣaṇā and the view of Ālaṃkārika regarding the vyāñjanā relation has been rejected. In this book, Jagadīśa offers a detailed analysis of different kinds of lakṣaṇā and in this context, one comes across a criticism of the Prabhākara thesis that the word having lakṣaṇā is not the cause of syntactic knowledge of the sentence. This book ends with an analysis of the nature of yogaruḍa śabda.
अवच्छेदकत्वनिरुक्ति: (Avacchedakattvaniruktiḥ)
In this book, Jagadīśa offers commentary on the nature of vyāpti as mentioned by Raghunatha Śiromaṇī in his Didhīti. Jagadīśa talks about two kinds of vyāpakatva in great detail. In this context, Jagadīśa alludes to the concept of avacchedakata and explains these allaying all the possible questions that one could raise in this context.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-3))
The third volume of Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā contains an analysis of samāsa. The book starts with a presentation and analysis of the definition of samāsa in general. Jagadīśa distinguishes nitya samāsa from anitya samāsa. The present work contains an analysis of six kinds of samāsa, viz, 1. Dvigu, 2. Tatpuruṣa, 3. Avyaībhāva, 4. Bahubrīhi, 5. Dvandva. The author accepts another samāsa viz. Upapada. The Grammarians hold that the vigraha vākya and the samasta vākya do not have the same śakti and so the nature of understanding the meaning of the vigraha vākya does not amount to understanding the meaning of the samāsa. Jagadīśa refutes this view of the Grammarian and argues that both the vigraha vākya and the samāsa do possess the same meaning. While the traditional Pāṇinian grammar includes karmadhārāya samāsa in tatpuruṣa samāsa and dvigu samāsa in karmadhāraya samāsa, the Katantra Grammar includes dvigu samāsa in tatpuruṣa samāsa. Jagadīśa intervenes in this debate and holds that karmadhāraya and dvigu are independent samāsas and so he thinks that there are six kinds of samāsas viz. tatpuruṣa, avyaībhāva, bahubrīhi, dvandva, karmadhārāya and dvigu. In this book one finds a detailed analysis of all these six kinds of samāsa. Even if Jagadīśa does not accept upapada samāsa as an independent samāsa, still he offers an analysis of upapada samāsa on behalf of those who accept upapada samāsa.
ध्ब्मसजन्यभावयो: कार्यकारणभावरहस्यम् (Dhvaṃsa- Janyabhāvayoḥ Kārya-Kāraṇabhāvarahasyam)
In this essay, Harirama Tarkavagisa undertakes an analysis of the nature of the causal relationship between a positive effect and destruction. The author examines the nature of the inference viz. Dhvaṃsa is due to vināśa. If one takes into consideration this inference, there must be a hetu here and the hetu could be said to have an upadhi viz. Bhāvatva. Harirama, in this context, presents different ways of formulating the causal relation. The author ends this essay by concluding that the positive effect (janyabhāva) could be said to be the cause of destruction (dhvaṃsa) through the relation of pratiyogitva.
Gadādhara’s Theory of Objectivity Viṣayatāvāda (Part-One)
In this volume, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya presents an analysis of the fundamental concepts in Navya-Nyāya. The themes that have been discussed in this book are 1. Navya-Nyāya theory of Relation, Being in Aristotle and Navya-Nyāya, Navya-Nyāya theory of universals, Navya-Nyāya theory of abstraction, Navya-Nyāya theory of definition, Navya-Nyāya theory of causation, Comparative analysis of Frege and Gadādhara.
प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)
In this book, Harirama Tarkavagisa critically assesses the Mīmāṃśa theory of self-luminosity of knowledge. According to Prabhākara, the knower, the object of knowledge and the knowledge itself are apprehended in one go. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that knowledge is inferred through a property called knownness. Murāri Miśra, another Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, holds that knowledge is known in a subsequent knowledge called introspection. Harirāma, following the footsteps of Gaṅgeśa, argues that since sometimes doubt regarding the validity of knowledge arises in the third moment after the origin of knowledge, the validity of the knowledge is apprehended by something other than the totality of the causal conditions of that knowledge. Harirama further argues that there is something wrong with the thesis that knowledge is self-luminious.