Publications
Ātmatattvaviveka (Volume-1) আত্মতত্ত্ববিবেক (১ম খন্ড)
This book is a Bengali translation and explanation of Ātmatattvaviveka (written by Udayanāchārya) done by Dinanath Tripathi. Ātmatattvaviveka is a philosophical work refuting the Buddhist thesis. In the present volume, there is a detailed discussion of the Buddhist thesis of momentariness. The translator offers an exhaustive analysis of Udayana’s attempt to refute the doctrine of momentariness.
Ātmatattvaviveka (Volume-3) আত্মতত্ত্ববিবেক (৩য় খন্ড)
This book is a Bengali translation and explanation of Ātmatattvaviveka (written by Udayanāchārya) done by Dinanath Tripathi. Ātmatattvaviveka is a philosophical work refuting the Buddhist thesis. In the present volume, there is a detailed discussion of the Buddhist thesis that no external object exists independent of knowledge of them. The translator explains Udayanāchārya’s refutation of this Buddhist thesis.
Bhāratiya Darśana Koṣa (Volume-1) ভারতীয় দর্শন কোষ (১ম খন্ড)
The present book is a dictionary of the key philosophical terms used in Prācina-Nyāya, Navya-Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophical systems, compiled by Srimohan Bhattacharya and Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya. The terms are arranged in alphabetical order. Against each term, there is a short explanation of the meaning of these terms.
Bhāṣā-Paricchedaḥ भाषा- परिच्छेद:
The author of the present book, Pañcānana Śāstrī, offers a detailed presentation of the views of Viśvanāth Nyāyapañcānana. This discussion follows the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. There are five chapters in the book: 1. Pratyakṣakhanḍa, 2. Anumānakhanḍa, 3. Upamānakhanḍa, 4. Śabdakhanḍa and Guṇakhanḍa. Some of the key ideas on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school have been analysed in this book.
Gadādhara’s Theory of Objectivity Viṣayatāvāda (Part-Two)
In this book, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya offers a detailed analysis of the text called Viṣayatāvāda, written by Gadādhara. After explaining the traditional Navya-Nyāya theory of objectivity, the author presents the later Navya-Nyāya theory of objecthood where it has been argued that objecthood cannot be cognition itself. Gadādhara’s theory of relation has been analyzed in terms of objecthood of qualified cognition. A detailed analysis of the ideas of qualificandness, qualificandumness, predicatehood could be found in this book.
Īśvarasiddhivivecanam (Part-II) ईश्वर – सिद्धि – विवेचनम्
This book written by Dīnanāth Tripathi contains a discussion on the Mīmāṃṣā argument that tries to prove that one does not need to prove god since the consequences like attainment of svarga etc. are the results of the performance of Vedic sacrifices. In this context, the author explains the Nyāya view that justifies the existence of god in terms of parataḥ prāmānyavāda. The author also presents the Nyāya arguments against the Sāṃkhya view and concludes that if the views of Kapila etc are accepted, then the prāmānya of the Vedas would be threatened.
Navya-Nyāya Bhāṣāpradīpaḥ नब्य-न्याय भाषाप्रदीप:
The present book, written by Maheśa Chandra Nyāyaratna, translated and explained in Bengali by Kalipada Tarkāchārya, is an attempt to explain the meaning of some of the technical terms used in Navya-Nyāya philosophy. Since many of these terms like dharma, abhāva, lakṣaṇa etc. are used in many classical systems of Indian philosophy, understanding the significance of these terms is a prerequisite in the study of many schools of Indian philosophy.
Nyāya Praveśa ন্যায়প্রবেশ
This book is an introduction to Nyāya philosophy. Amarendra Mohan Bhattacharya, the author of this book, presents his analysis in eight chapters: 1. Introduction, 2. Determining padārtha, 3. Determining dravya, 4. Determining guṇa, 5. Determining karma etc. 6. Determining abhāva, 7. Determining sixteen padārthas, 8. Determining other padārthas. This book is an attempt to present the fundamentals of Nyāya philosophy in the Bengali language.
Nyāyadarśan Mate Ātmā ন্যায় দর্শন মতে আত্মা
In this book, written by Tarapada Bhattacharya, one finds an elaborate analysis of the Nyāya theory of self. Following a discussion of the proofs for the existence of self, one finds deliberations on the nature of self as distinct from body. Nyāya arguments for the view that self is eternal and has attributes have been presented. The plurality and ubiquitous nature of self have been proved. The question about the emancipation of self has been discussed. The book ends with a discussion on the nature of god as paramātmān.
Nyāyakusumāñjali (Part-1)
The present book, edited by Narendrachandra Vedantatirtha, contains the original text (first Stavka) of Nyāyakusumāñjali along with the commentaries of Śaṅkara Miśra and Guṇānda Vidyāvāgīśa. These commentaries explain the original text sometimes by elucidating the original points and sometimes refuting the alternative conclusions. The entire first chapter of this book centres around the possible objections to the nature of causality that Nyāya argument for the existence of god depends on.
Nyāyamañjuri (Volume-2) ন্যায়মঞ্জুরী (২য় খন্ড)
This book written by Pañchānana Tarkavāgīṣa, is an exposition of the chapter on perception as one finds in Nyāyamañjuri There is a detailed analysis of the definition of perception as proposed in Nyāyamañjuri. A critical examination of each of the terms present in the definition of perception has been undertaken, In this context, the Buddhist view regarding denying the veridicality of judgemental perception has been presented and refuted.
Tantrālokaḥ (Volume-1) তন্ত্ৰালোক: (প্রথম ভাগ)
In this book, the author Brahmacari Medhacaitanya offers detail analysis of the first chapter of Tantrāloka written by Abhinavagupta. A detailed analysis of the ultimate reality, known as Śiva, has been offered followed by a discussion on the nature of the individual self as advocated by Abhinavagupta.
Tantrālokaḥ (Volume-2) তন্ত্ৰালোক: (দ্বিতীয় ভাগ)
In this book, the author Brahmacari Medhacaitanya offers a detailed analysis of the first chapter of Tantrāloka written by Abhinavagupta. The second part contains a detailed discussion on the nature and varieties of knowledge. Since ignorance is the cause of one’s bondage, it is only when complete knowledge dawns on us, that liberation arrives.
The Padārthatattva-Nirūpaṇam (পদার্থতত্বনিরুপনম)
The present book, written by Raghunātha Śiramaṇi and translated and explained in Bengali by Madhusudan Bhattacharya, is an attempt to present his views on the metaphysical categories generally accepted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. Raghunātha, of course, refutes some of the categories accepted by earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. He even does not hesitate to accept some of the views of the Mīmāṁsā philosophy, thereby going against his own tradition.
अनुमितेमानसत्त्वबिचाररहस्यम् (Anumiter Mānasatvavicārarahasyam)
Harirama Tarkavagisa, in this book, examines the proposal that inference could be subsumed under supersensual perception as accepted in Nyāya. Harirama argues that not all cases of inference could be so explained. He imagines all sorts of possible objections to the view that inference, really speaking, is a kind of perception and refutes all these, defending the thesis that inference is to be regarded as an independent source of knowledge.
अवच्छेदकत्वनिरुक्ति: (Avacchedakattvaniruktiḥ)
In this book, Jagadīśa offers commentary on the nature of vyāpti as mentioned by Raghunatha Śiromaṇī in his Didhīti. Jagadīśa talks about two kinds of vyāpakatva in great detail. In this context, Jagadīśa alludes to the concept of avacchedakata and explains these allaying all the possible questions that one could raise in this context.
पक्षताप्रकरणम् (Pakṣtā Prakaraṇam)
In this book Jagadśa undertakes a study of the concept of pakṣatā. Pakṣatā is regarded as the cause of inference. Some define pakṣatā as sādhyasaṃśaya. Some others define pakṣatā as siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣtasiddhyabhāvaḥ. A detailed analysis of all these issues has been done by the author in this book.
प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)
In this book, Harirama Tarkavagisa critically assesses the Mīmāṃśa theory of self-luminosity of knowledge. According to Prabhākara, the knower, the object of knowledge and the knowledge itself are apprehended in one go. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that knowledge is inferred through a property called knownness. Murāri Miśra, another Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, holds that knowledge is known in a subsequent knowledge called introspection. Harirāma, following the footsteps of Gaṅgeśa, argues that since sometimes doubt regarding the validity of knowledge arises in the third moment after the origin of knowledge, the validity of the knowledge is apprehended by something other than the totality of the causal conditions of that knowledge. Harirama further argues that there is something wrong with the thesis that knowledge is self-luminious.
प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)
The original text of Gaṅgeśa, called Tattvacintāmaṇi, has been commented on by both Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Gadāhara Bhattācārya. If knowledge is gained through the ways of knowing, then the very nature of knowledge rests on the nature and veridicality of these recognised ways of knowing. An examination of the veridicality of the ways of knowing is known as pārāmānya. In this book, both Raghunātha and Jagadīśa offer a detailed analysis of the debate concerning the nature and veridicality of the very idea of pramāṇa.
मुक्तिबादबिचारः (Muktivādavicaraḥ)
This book is an essay on Nyāya theory of liberation. Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa, in this book, critically assesses the generally accepted definition of liberation as permanent (ātyantika) cessation (nivṛtti) of suffering (duhkha). The debate revolves around explaining the terms like ‘atyanta’ and ‘nivṛtti’. Harirama argues that the widely accepted understanding of these words fails to cover all the different kinds of liberation that philosophers talk about. Harirama proposes to describe liberation as the destruction of final suffering and the idea of finality could be understood as a universal inhering in suffering. Harirama argues that if knowledge of reality is to be regarded as the cause of liberation, then liberation is to be regarded as the permanent post-negation of sin and not of misery.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-1))
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā is an important text written by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra containing an analysis of śabda pramāna following the Navya-Nyāya tradition. This work is a defence of many of the theses of Gaṅgeśa, the author of Tattvacintāmaṇi. In many places, the views of Bhatṛhari and Srīpatidatta, the author of Kalapa-pariśiṣta, have been critically assessed and defended. The author offers a detailed analysis of how the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is generated through the presence of the elements like ākāṁṣkā, yogyatā and āsatti. Since the meaning of a word is defined in terms of śakti, a question arises with regard to the locus of śakti. Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas hold that śakti stays in the universal. Jagadīśa refutes this thesis of the Mīmāṁsakas. The author also refutes the thesis that the locus of śakti is the individual object, a view that is propagated by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. Jagadīśa defends the view that combines both the insights that the locus of śakti is the individual object and the locus of śakti is the universal. In this book, Jagadīśa presents an analysis of the nature of lakṣanā. In this work we also find an analysis of how ākaṁkṣā, yogyatā and āsatti could be treated as the cause of understanding the meaning of a sentence. Jagadīśa, however, refutes the view that the knowledge of tātparya is the cause of understanding the meaning of a sentence, instead proposes the view that prakaraṇajñāna is the cause of understanding the meaning of a sentence. Thus in the present work the author, after defending śabdapramāṇa as an independent pramāṇa, offers his analysis of the ways of generating linguistic understanding.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-3))
The third volume of Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā contains an analysis of samāsa. The book starts with a presentation and analysis of the definition of samāsa in general. Jagadīśa distinguishes nitya samāsa from anitya samāsa. The present work contains an analysis of six kinds of samāsa, viz, 1. Dvigu, 2. Tatpuruṣa, 3. Avyaībhāva, 4. Bahubrīhi, 5. Dvandva. The author accepts another samāsa viz. Upapada. The Grammarians hold that the vigraha vākya and the samasta vākya do not have the same śakti and so the nature of understanding the meaning of the vigraha vākya does not amount to understanding the meaning of the samāsa. Jagadīśa refutes this view of the Grammarian and argues that both the vigraha vākya and the samāsa do possess the same meaning. While the traditional Pāṇinian grammar includes karmadhārāya samāsa in tatpuruṣa samāsa and dvigu samāsa in karmadhāraya samāsa, the Katantra Grammar includes dvigu samāsa in tatpuruṣa samāsa. Jagadīśa intervenes in this debate and holds that karmadhāraya and dvigu are independent samāsas and so he thinks that there are six kinds of samāsas viz. tatpuruṣa, avyaībhāva, bahubrīhi, dvandva, karmadhārāya and dvigu. In this book one finds a detailed analysis of all these six kinds of samāsa. Even if Jagadīśa does not accept upapada samāsa as an independent samāsa, still he offers an analysis of upapada samāsa on behalf of those who accept upapada samāsa.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdśaktiprakāśikā)
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā contains six chapters: 1. Nāmaprakaraṇa, 2. Samāsaprakaraṇa, 3. Supvibhaktiprakaraṇa, 4. Kārakaprakaraṇa, 5. Akhyātaprakaraṇa, 6. Taddhitaprakaraṇa. The present volume contains two commentaries on Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā viz. . Kriśnakānti commentary by Krisnakānta Vidyāvāgīśa and Pravbodhinī commentary by Rāmabhadra Siddhāntavāgīśa.
सिद्धान्तलक्षणम् (Siddhānta Lakṣaṇam)
The final definition of vyāpti, known as siddhāntalakṣaṇa, has been explained by Jagadīśa in this work. The final definition of vyāpti is: where pratiyogyasāmānadhikaraṇya tāsāmānādhikaraṇatyantābhāvāpratiyogitāvacchedakabhacchinam does not hold, their vyāpti stays in the same locus. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi comments on this definition of vyāpti. Jagadīṣa further explains this final definition of vyāpti.