Navya Nyāya Scholarship in Nabadwip Archive Collection/ Gaṇgeśaopādhyāya/ Prāmāṇyavādaḥ/ Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Gadādhara Bhattācharya (Commentator)/ Pt. Jwala Prasad Gaud (Editor) / Chaukhamba Surbharati Prakashan / The Chaukhamba Surbharati Granthamala Series: 236/ Number of pages: 228/
प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)
The original text of Gaṅgeśa, called Tattvacintāmaṇi, has been commented on by both Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Gadāhara Bhattācārya. If knowledge is gained through the ways of knowing, then the very nature of knowledge rests on the nature and veridicality of these recognised ways of knowing. An examination of the veridicality of the ways of knowing is known as pārāmānya. In this book, both Raghunātha and Jagadīśa offer a detailed analysis of the debate concerning the nature and veridicality of the very idea of pramāṇa.
| System |
Nyāya |
|---|---|
| Publication Category |
Navya-Nyāya Scholarship in Nabadwip |
| Publication Author | |
| Added Author |
Bhattacharya, Visvabandhu $e Comm. |
| Publication Language |
Sanskrit |
| Publisher Name |
Sanskrit College |
| Publication Place |
Calcutta |
| Publication Year |
1964 |
| No. of Pages |
70 |
| Series Name |
Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series No. XXXV |
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In this book, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya offers a detailed analysis of the text called Viṣayatāvāda, written by Gadādhara. After explaining the traditional Navya-Nyāya theory of objectivity, the author presents the later Navya-Nyāya theory of objecthood where it has been argued that objecthood cannot be cognition itself. Gadādhara’s theory of relation has been analyzed in terms of objecthood of qualified cognition. A detailed analysis of the ideas of qualificandness, qualificandumness, predicatehood could be found in this book.
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This is a prakaraṇa text on the Nyāya theory of vyāpti written by Jagadīśa. The main theme of the work centres around the nature of vyāpti.Knowledge of vyāpti is the cause of inferential knowledge. If the definition of vyāpti is constructed in terms of avyābhicāritatva, then one could explain avyābhicāritatva in five alternative ways. And none of these alternatives is acceptable, for this understanding of vyāpti would fail to account for kevalānvayi inference. In order to remove this problem, the definition of vyāpti is reconstructed as pratiyogivṛttidharmāvacchinna-pratiyogitākabhāvarupa vyādhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnabhāva. Jagadīśa examines this new definition of vyāpti and offers his justification, refuting all the possible objections.
मुक्तिबादबिचारः (Muktivādavicaraḥ)
This book is an essay on Nyāya theory of liberation. Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa, in this book, critically assesses the generally accepted definition of liberation as permanent (ātyantika) cessation (nivṛtti) of suffering (duhkha). The debate revolves around explaining the terms like ‘atyanta’ and ‘nivṛtti’. Harirama argues that the widely accepted understanding of these words fails to cover all the different kinds of liberation that philosophers talk about. Harirama proposes to describe liberation as the destruction of final suffering and the idea of finality could be understood as a universal inhering in suffering. Harirama argues that if knowledge of reality is to be regarded as the cause of liberation, then liberation is to be regarded as the permanent post-negation of sin and not of misery.
सिद्धान्तलक्षणम् (Siddhānta Lakṣaṇam)
The final definition of vyāpti, known as siddhāntalakṣaṇa, has been explained by Jagadīśa in this work. The final definition of vyāpti is: where pratiyogyasāmānadhikaraṇya tāsāmānādhikaraṇatyantābhāvāpratiyogitāvacchedakabhacchinam does not hold, their vyāpti stays in the same locus. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi comments on this definition of vyāpti. Jagadīṣa further explains this final definition of vyāpti.
अवच्छेदकत्वनिरुक्ति: (Avacchedakattvaniruktiḥ)
In this book, Jagadīśa offers commentary on the nature of vyāpti as mentioned by Raghunatha Śiromaṇī in his Didhīti. Jagadīśa talks about two kinds of vyāpakatva in great detail. In this context, Jagadīśa alludes to the concept of avacchedakata and explains these allaying all the possible questions that one could raise in this context.
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In this book, Gadādhara Bhattāchārya presents a theory of the meaning of words. This work is divided into three chapters: 1. Sāmānyakāṇḍa, 2. Viśesakāṣḍa and 3. Pariśiṣtakāṇḍa. In Sāmānyakaṇḍa, the author undertakes a detailed analysis of vṛtti of words. Here one comes across a definition of śakti in terms of which a word denotes its meaning. The theory of anvitābhidhāna has been refuted. In the Viśeṣakaṇḍa, the author undertakes an analysis of the meaning of words denoting an individual and the meaning of the words denoting a universal. Prabhākara theory of meaning has been refuted. This chapter contains an analysis of indexicals and demonstratives. The third chapter viz. Pariśiṣtakaṇḍa contains a defence of the view that the śakti of a word lies in the individual that is qualified by the corresponding universal. Views of several Mīmāṃsaka philosophers have been critically assessed.
अनुमितेमानसत्त्वबिचाररहस्यम् (Anumiter Mānasatvavicārarahasyam)
Harirama Tarkavagisa, in this book, examines the proposal that inference could be subsumed under supersensual perception as accepted in Nyāya. Harirama argues that not all cases of inference could be so explained. He imagines all sorts of possible objections to the view that inference, really speaking, is a kind of perception and refutes all these, defending the thesis that inference is to be regarded as an independent source of knowledge.