Navya Nyāya Scholarship in Nabadwip Archive Collection/ JagadīśaTarkālaṃkāra/ Avacchedakattvaniruktiḥ/ Dattātreya Śāstri Ogale (Commentator)/ Swāmī Dharmānanda Mahābhāga (Editor)/ Chaukhambha Sanskrit Sansthan / Publication:2007/ The Kashi Sanskrit Series 203/ Number of pages: 160/
अवच्छेदकत्वनिरुक्ति: (Avacchedakattvaniruktiḥ)
In this book, Jagadīśa offers commentary on the nature of vyāpti as mentioned by Raghunatha Śiromaṇī in his Didhīti. Jagadīśa talks about two kinds of vyāpakatva in great detail. In this context, Jagadīśa alludes to the concept of avacchedakata and explains these allaying all the possible questions that one could raise in this context.
| System |
Nyāya |
|---|---|
| Publication Category |
Navya-Nyāya Scholarship in Nabadwip |
| Publication Author | |
| Added Author |
Dattātreya Śāstrī $e Comm.; Mahābhāga, Ogale, Swāmī Dharmānanda $e Editor |
| Publication Language |
Sanskrit |
| Edition |
First |
| Publisher Name |
Chaukhambha Sanskrit Sansthan |
| Publication Place |
Varanasi |
| Publication Year |
2007 |
| No. of Pages |
162 |
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