Philosophers in Modern India/ Aruna Chakraborty / Nyāya Darśne Parāmarśa/ Nripendra Bhattacharyya/ Publication: 1978 / Number of pages: 226/
Nyāya Darśne Parāmarśa ন্যায় দর্শনে পরামর্শ
This book, written by Aruna Chakrabarti, offers an analysis of the role of parāmarśa in the generation of inferential knowledge. The book is divided into five chapters: 1. The nature and definition of parāmarśa, 2. Kinds of parāmarśa, 3. Parāmarśa as the cause or vyāpāra , 4. Parāmarśa as the cause of anumiti and 5. The relation between pakṣata and parāmarśa. Since Inference is a recognized source of knowledge for Nyāya, an analysis of parāmarśa as the cause of inferential knowledge forms an integral part of any discussion on Nyāya epistemology.
| System |
– |
|---|---|
| Publication Category |
Philosophers of Modern India |
| Publication Author | |
| Publication Language |
Bengali |
| Publisher Name |
Nripendra Bhattacharyya |
| Publication Place |
Calcutta |
| Publication Year |
1978 |
| No. of Pages |
226 |
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