Publications
Advaitamata-samīkṣā অদ্বৈতমত-সমীক্ষা
In this book, Srimohan Tarkavedāntatārtha, the author, offers an explanation of some of the central tenets of Advaita Vedānta. The first chapter discusses how some of the philosophical views of the opponents of Advaita Vedānta have been reformulated in accordance with the tenor of Advaita Vedānta. The second chapter undertakes a discussion of the comparative estimate of the views of the two schools of Advaita Vedānta viz. Vivaraṇa and Bhāmatī schools. The last chapter presents an analysis of the theory of Śabdaparokṣavāda, a view defended by the Vivaraṇa school of Advaita Vedānta.
Advaitavedante Pratikarmavyavastha অদ্বৈতবেদান্তে প্রতিকর্মব্যবস্থা
This book, written by Nirmal Kumar panigrahi, is a detailed analysis of a lesser-known aspect of Advaita Vedānta theory of knowledge. The question that the book deals with is: why does an individual have knowledge of one thing at one point in time and why doesn’t he/she have knowledge of all things all the time? This shows that there is a rule governing individuals having knowledge of things at different times. This is unknown as Pratikarmavyāvasthā. The author discusses the Advaita Vedānta analysis of this and presents the objections advanced by Naiyāyaika and Madhva philosophers. The author also relates this particular epistemological thesis with the metaphysical position of the Advaita Vedānta philosophers.
Ātmatattvaviveka (Volume-1) আত্মতত্ত্ববিবেক (১ম খন্ড)
This book is a Bengali translation and explanation of Ātmatattvaviveka (written by Udayanāchārya) done by Dinanath Tripathi. Ātmatattvaviveka is a philosophical work refuting the Buddhist thesis. In the present volume, there is a detailed discussion of the Buddhist thesis of momentariness. The translator offers an exhaustive analysis of Udayana’s attempt to refute the doctrine of momentariness.
Ātmatattvaviveka (Volume-3) আত্মতত্ত্ববিবেক (৩য় খন্ড)
This book is a Bengali translation and explanation of Ātmatattvaviveka (written by Udayanāchārya) done by Dinanath Tripathi. Ātmatattvaviveka is a philosophical work refuting the Buddhist thesis. In the present volume, there is a detailed discussion of the Buddhist thesis that no external object exists independent of knowledge of them. The translator explains Udayanāchārya’s refutation of this Buddhist thesis.
Bauddhācāryasammata Svārthānumāner Saṁkṣipta Ālocanā বৌদ্ধাচার্যসম্মত স্বার্থানুমানের সংক্ষিপ্ত আলোচনা
This book, written by Heramba Chattopadhyay, is a detail presentation of the Buddhist theory of svārthānumāna. In the introduction, the author presents a historical survey of the key contributions of Buddhist philosophers in the field of logic. In the main body of the text, the reader finds an analysis of the Buddhist theory of inference along with a presentation of the different criticisms levelled against the Buddhist theory by rival philosophical systems of classical Indian Philosophy.
Bhāratiya Darśana Koṣa (Volume-1) ভারতীয় দর্শন কোষ (১ম খন্ড)
The present book is a dictionary of the key philosophical terms used in Prācina-Nyāya, Navya-Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophical systems, compiled by Srimohan Bhattacharya and Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya. The terms are arranged in alphabetical order. Against each term, there is a short explanation of the meaning of these terms.
Jainadarśaner Digdarśana জৈনদর্শনের দিগ্দর্শন
Satindra Chandra Nyāyāchārya presents an outline of Jaina philosophy in this book. The author argues that Syādvāda and Nayavāda are the two main fundamental theses of Jainism. The book contains a detailed presentation of the Jaina theory of pramāṇa. The author explains why the Jainas accept pratyabhijñā as an indirect pramāṇa. There is also a discussion on the Jaina view that upamāṇa pramāṇa could be included in pratyabhijñā. The author ends his discourse with a discussion on Nayavāda.
Mānmeyodayaḥ (Volume-1) মানমেয়োদয়: (২য় খন্ড)
This book written by Dīnanāth Tripathi is a detail exposition of Mīmāṃsā text Mānameodaya, originally authored by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa. This book is divided into two sections, viz. Pramāṇa and Prameya. After proposing the definition of pramāṇa, the author presents a detailed analysis of all the six pramāṇas accepted by the Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā philosophy. During this discourse, the views of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, Buddhism and Prābhākara have been refuted. In the Prameya section, there is a discussion on the five prameyas accepted in the Bhaṭṭa school, viz. dravya, jāti, guṇa, kriya and abhāva.
Nyāyadarśan Mate Ātmā ন্যায় দর্শন মতে আত্মা
In this book, written by Tarapada Bhattacharya, one finds an elaborate analysis of the Nyāya theory of self. Following a discussion of the proofs for the existence of self, one finds deliberations on the nature of self as distinct from body. Nyāya arguments for the view that self is eternal and has attributes have been presented. The plurality and ubiquitous nature of self have been proved. The question about the emancipation of self has been discussed. The book ends with a discussion on the nature of god as paramātmān.
Sāṃkhyadarśan সাংখ্যদর্শন
This book, written by Bhupendranath Bhattacharya, is a detailed presentation of the main features of Sāṃkhya philosophy. There are seven chapters in the book that contain discussions on Saṃkhya theory of pramāṇa, Sāṃkhya theory of god, Sāṃkhya theory of causation, Sāṃkhya theory of guṇa, Sāṃkhya theory of prakṛti, Sāṃkhya theory of puruṣa, Sāṃkhya theory of mahat-tattva, Sāṃkhya theory of subtle body, Sāṃkhya theory of bhautika sarga, Sāṃkhya theory of pralaya, Sāṃkhya theory of liberation respectively.
Tantra O Āgamaśāstrer Digdarśan তন্ত্র ও আগম শাস্ত্রের দিগদর্শন
This book written by Gopinath Kaviraj is an introduction to the philosophy of Tantra. This book is divided into three sections: 1. Theories of Tantra, 2. Schools of Tantra and 3. Fundamental Tantric texts. The first section presents the dualist perspective of Śaivagama. Some of the fundamental concepts of this school have been analyzed. The second section contains a discussion on two main schools of Tantra philosophy, viz. Kaula school and Kapalika school. The third section presents a brief history of the salient works written on Tantra philosophy like daśa śivagama, astadaśa rudragama etc.
The Padārthatattva-Nirūpaṇam (পদার্থতত্বনিরুপনম)
The present book, written by Raghunātha Śiramaṇi and translated and explained in Bengali by Madhusudan Bhattacharya, is an attempt to present his views on the metaphysical categories generally accepted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. Raghunātha, of course, refutes some of the categories accepted by earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. He even does not hesitate to accept some of the views of the Mīmāṁsā philosophy, thereby going against his own tradition.
The Vidhi Viveka (Volume-1) বিধিবিবেক (১ম ভাগ)
Since Mīmāṃsā philosophy is known as the study of Vedic sentences, and since knowledge of vidhi sentences are required to perform the Vedic rituals resulting in the production of dharma, analysis and classification of vidhi sentence forms an important part of Mīmāṃsā philosophy. The present book, authored by Srimohan Bhattacharya, offers an explanation of the views of Maṇḍan Miśra as one finds in his Vidhi-Viveka with regard to the nature and varieties of vidhi sentence. The author also alludes to the Nyāya-Kanikā commentary written by Vācaspati Miśra on Vidhi-Viveka. In the course of the discussion, the author presents Maṇḍana Miśra’s refutation of the doctrine of momentariness and his rejection of the idea of omniscience targeting Buddhism, Yoga and Nyāya.
The Vyakti-Viveka (Part-1) व्यक्ति-विवेक:
This book, written by Mahima Bhaṭṭa, has been explained in Bengali by Bishnupada Bhattacharya. In this book, the author criticizes the Dhvani theory propounded by Ānandavardhan. Mahima Bhaṭṭa, like fellow Kashmir thinkers, was influenced by the philosophy of Pratyabhijñā. Mahima Bhaṭṭa was also well acquainted with the works of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. The central contention of Mahima Bhaṭṭa, which has been explained in this book, is that Dhvani theory and vyāñjanā relation could be included in inferential knowledge. Mahima Bhaṭṭa argues that words have only the power of meaning and nothing else is required to account for the denotative power.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-1))
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā is an important text written by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra containing an analysis of śabda pramāna following the Navya-Nyāya tradition. This work is a defence of many of the theses of Gaṅgeśa, the author of Tattvacintāmaṇi. In many places, the views of Bhatṛhari and Srīpatidatta, the author of Kalapa-pariśiṣta, have been critically assessed and defended. The author offers a detailed analysis of how the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is generated through the presence of the elements like ākāṁṣkā, yogyatā and āsatti. Since the meaning of a word is defined in terms of śakti, a question arises with regard to the locus of śakti. Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas hold that śakti stays in the universal. Jagadīśa refutes this thesis of the Mīmāṁsakas. The author also refutes the thesis that the locus of śakti is the individual object, a view that is propagated by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. Jagadīśa defends the view that combines both the insights that the locus of śakti is the individual object and the locus of śakti is the universal. In this book, Jagadīśa presents an analysis of the nature of lakṣanā. In this work we also find an analysis of how ākaṁkṣā, yogyatā and āsatti could be treated as the cause of understanding the meaning of a sentence. Jagadīśa, however, refutes the view that the knowledge of tātparya is the cause of understanding the meaning of a sentence, instead proposes the view that prakaraṇajñāna is the cause of understanding the meaning of a sentence. Thus in the present work the author, after defending śabdapramāṇa as an independent pramāṇa, offers his analysis of the ways of generating linguistic understanding.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-2))
In the second volume of Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, Jagadīśa presents a detailed analysis of Prabhākara’s kāryānvitaśaktivāda and refutes this view. Jagadīśa defends the niravacchinna śaktivāda of the words like ākāśa etc. The view of Raghuntha Siromani with regard to the causal nexus of linguistic understanding has been refuted. Jagadisa offers an analysis of the nature of paribhāṣika śabda and argues that proper names given to individuals do not have śakti and they are to be treated as paribhāśaika śabda. Jagadīśa defends the view that śakti resides in all the three loci: the individual, the universal and the relation of samavāya that holds between an individual and the universal. Jagadīśa also refutes the Mīmāṃsaka view that the sentence has lakṣaṇā and the view of Ālaṃkārika regarding the vyāñjanā relation has been rejected. In this book, Jagadīśa offers a detailed analysis of different kinds of lakṣaṇā and in this context, one comes across a criticism of the Prabhākara thesis that the word having lakṣaṇā is not the cause of syntactic knowledge of the sentence. This book ends with an analysis of the nature of yogaruḍa śabda.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-3))
The third volume of Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā contains an analysis of samāsa. The book starts with a presentation and analysis of the definition of samāsa in general. Jagadīśa distinguishes nitya samāsa from anitya samāsa. The present work contains an analysis of six kinds of samāsa, viz, 1. Dvigu, 2. Tatpuruṣa, 3. Avyaībhāva, 4. Bahubrīhi, 5. Dvandva. The author accepts another samāsa viz. Upapada. The Grammarians hold that the vigraha vākya and the samasta vākya do not have the same śakti and so the nature of understanding the meaning of the vigraha vākya does not amount to understanding the meaning of the samāsa. Jagadīśa refutes this view of the Grammarian and argues that both the vigraha vākya and the samāsa do possess the same meaning. While the traditional Pāṇinian grammar includes karmadhārāya samāsa in tatpuruṣa samāsa and dvigu samāsa in karmadhāraya samāsa, the Katantra Grammar includes dvigu samāsa in tatpuruṣa samāsa. Jagadīśa intervenes in this debate and holds that karmadhāraya and dvigu are independent samāsas and so he thinks that there are six kinds of samāsas viz. tatpuruṣa, avyaībhāva, bahubrīhi, dvandva, karmadhārāya and dvigu. In this book one finds a detailed analysis of all these six kinds of samāsa. Even if Jagadīśa does not accept upapada samāsa as an independent samāsa, still he offers an analysis of upapada samāsa on behalf of those who accept upapada samāsa.
