Philosophers in Modern India/ Satischandra Chatterjee/ The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge/ University of Calcutta/ Publication: 1978/ Number of pages: 407/
The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge
The present book is a detailed exposition of Nyāya epistemology. The book contains twenty chapters: 1. Introduction, 2. The nature and forms of knowledge, 3. Valid knowledge and its method, 4. The factors of valid knowledge, 5. The test of truth and error, 6. The definition of perception, 7. The psychology of perception, 8. Ordinary perception and its objects, 9. Three modes of ordinary perception, 10. Extraordinary perception, 11. The nature of inference, 12. The grounds of inference, 13. Classification and Logical forms of inference, 14. The fallacies of inference, 15. The nature and forms of upamāna, 16. Upamāna as an independent source of knowledge, 17. The nature and classification of śabda, 18. Of words, 19, Of sentences, 20. Other sources of knowledge. This book thus offers an analysis of the different pramāṇas accepted by Nyāya.
| System |
– |
|---|---|
| Publication Category |
Philosophers of Modern India |
| Publication Author | |
| Publication Language |
English |
| Publisher Name |
University of Calcutta |
| Publication Place |
Calcutta |
| Publication Year |
1978 |
| No. of Pages |
407 |
Kindly Register and Login to Darshan Manisha Digital Library. Only Registered Users Can Access the Content of Darshan Manisha Digital Library.
0
People watching this product now!
Description
Related products
जागदीशीव्याधिकरणम् (Jāgadīśvyādhikaraṇam)
This is a prakaraṇa text on the Nyāya theory of vyāpti written by Jagadīśa. The main theme of the work centres around the nature of vyāpti.Knowledge of vyāpti is the cause of inferential knowledge. If the definition of vyāpti is constructed in terms of avyābhicāritatva, then one could explain avyābhicāritatva in five alternative ways. And none of these alternatives is acceptable, for this understanding of vyāpti would fail to account for kevalānvayi inference. In order to remove this problem, the definition of vyāpti is reconstructed as pratiyogivṛttidharmāvacchinna-pratiyogitākabhāvarupa vyādhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnabhāva. Jagadīśa examines this new definition of vyāpti and offers his justification, refuting all the possible objections.
Mānmeyodayaḥ (Volume-1) মানমেয়োদয়: (২য় খন্ড)
This book written by Dīnanāth Tripathi is a detail exposition of Mīmāṃsā text Mānameodaya, originally authored by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa. This book is divided into two sections, viz. Pramāṇa and Prameya. After proposing the definition of pramāṇa, the author presents a detailed analysis of all the six pramāṇas accepted by the Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā philosophy. During this discourse, the views of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, Buddhism and Prābhākara have been refuted. In the Prameya section, there is a discussion on the five prameyas accepted in the Bhaṭṭa school, viz. dravya, jāti, guṇa, kriya and abhāva.
Advaitasiddhiḥ (Volume-2) অদ্বৈতসিদ্ধি: (২য় খন্ড)
In this book, Yogendranāth Tarkasāṃkhyavedantatīrtha, the author, offers a detailed analysis of the first definition of ignorance that one finds in the text Advaitasiddhi by Madhusūdana Sarasvati. The book starts with presenting a history of Advaita-Vedānta followed by the biography of Madhusudana Saraswati. There is also an introductory analysis of some of the key Nyāya ideas, for the author of Advaitasiddhi himself takes recourse to some Nyāya techniques in defending the Advaita thesis.
Īśvarasiddhivivecanam (Part-II) ईश्वर – सिद्धि – विवेचनम्
This book written by Dīnanāth Tripathi contains a discussion on the Mīmāṃṣā argument that tries to prove that one does not need to prove god since the consequences like attainment of svarga etc. are the results of the performance of Vedic sacrifices. In this context, the author explains the Nyāya view that justifies the existence of god in terms of parataḥ prāmānyavāda. The author also presents the Nyāya arguments against the Sāṃkhya view and concludes that if the views of Kapila etc are accepted, then the prāmānya of the Vedas would be threatened.
The Vidhi Viveka (Volume-1) বিধিবিবেক (১ম ভাগ)
Since Mīmāṃsā philosophy is known as the study of Vedic sentences, and since knowledge of vidhi sentences are required to perform the Vedic rituals resulting in the production of dharma, analysis and classification of vidhi sentence forms an important part of Mīmāṃsā philosophy. The present book, authored by Srimohan Bhattacharya, offers an explanation of the views of Maṇḍan Miśra as one finds in his Vidhi-Viveka with regard to the nature and varieties of vidhi sentence. The author also alludes to the Nyāya-Kanikā commentary written by Vācaspati Miśra on Vidhi-Viveka. In the course of the discussion, the author presents Maṇḍana Miśra’s refutation of the doctrine of momentariness and his rejection of the idea of omniscience targeting Buddhism, Yoga and Nyāya.
A Study in the Dialectical of Sphoṭa
Gaurinatha Sastri, in this book, deals with the idea of sphoṭa as one finds in the Grammarian Tradition in classical Indian philosophy. The book contains four chapters: 1. Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā objections to the idea of sphoṭa, 2. The views of Kumārila, Śabara and Jayanta on sphoṭa. 3. Classification of Sphoṭa and 4. Authority of Āgama on sphoṭa.
Classical Indian Philosophies: Their Synthesis in The Philosophy of Sri Ramakrishna
In this book, Satischandra Chatterjee, presents the salient views of different classical Indian philosophical systems and shows how these divergent views could be synthesized in the philosophy of Ramakrishna. The book contains ten chapters: 1. Introduction, 2. The Cārvāka Philosophy, 3. The Bauddha Philosophy, 4. The Jaina Philosophy, 5. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, 6. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga Philosophy, 7. The Mīmāṃsā Philosophy, 8. The Vedānta Philosophy, 9. The Synthesis of the Systems and 10. The Philosophy of Ramakrishna. The author argues how on the basis of the idea of adhikāri-veda the divergent views of the different philosophical systems could be synthesised and the author takes cues from the ideas advocated by Sri Ramakrishna in this attempt.
ध्ब्मसजन्यभावयो: कार्यकारणभावरहस्यम् (Dhvaṃsa- Janyabhāvayoḥ Kārya-Kāraṇabhāvarahasyam)
In this essay, Harirama Tarkavagisa undertakes an analysis of the nature of the causal relationship between a positive effect and destruction. The author examines the nature of the inference viz. Dhvaṃsa is due to vināśa. If one takes into consideration this inference, there must be a hetu here and the hetu could be said to have an upadhi viz. Bhāvatva. Harirama, in this context, presents different ways of formulating the causal relation. The author ends this essay by concluding that the positive effect (janyabhāva) could be said to be the cause of destruction (dhvaṃsa) through the relation of pratiyogitva.
अनुमितेमानसत्त्वबिचाररहस्यम् (Anumiter Mānasatvavicārarahasyam)
Harirama Tarkavagisa, in this book, examines the proposal that inference could be subsumed under supersensual perception as accepted in Nyāya. Harirama argues that not all cases of inference could be so explained. He imagines all sorts of possible objections to the view that inference, really speaking, is a kind of perception and refutes all these, defending the thesis that inference is to be regarded as an independent source of knowledge.